The Peter A. Allard School of Law

Allard Research Commons
All Faculty Publications

Allard Faculty Publications

2003

Shenpi (Licensing) Reform From The Perspective of One
Municipal Jurisdiction: Ideologies, Institutions, and Law
Wei Cui
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, cui@allard.ubc.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Citation Details
Wei Cui, "Shenpi (Licensing) Reform From The Perspective of One Municipal Jurisdiction: Ideologies,
Institutions, and Law" (2003) 33:2 Hong Kong LJ 417.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard Research
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard
Research Commons.

CHINESE LAW
SHENPI (LICENSING) REFORM FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF ONE MUNICIPAL JURISDICTION:
IDEOLOGIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND LAW
Wei Cui*
The Administrative Licensing Law (xingzheng xuke fa) will constitute a major
addition to Chinese administrative law, and the rhetoric surroundingits drafting
promises path-breakingreform of the Chinese regulatory state. This report critically
assesses that promise by chronicling the actual course of shenpi (licensing) reform
carriedout in Shenzhen in 2001. Shenpi reform derives its novelty from questioning
the rationale of regulatory policies and not just the procedures by which they are
carriedout. In Shenzhen, however, the reform revolved aroundan effort to achieve
quantitativereduction in the number of shenpi procedures, which could reflect either
changes in the substance of policies or mere success in cutting red tape. Close
examination reveals that Shenzhen's reform was a combination of house cleaning
againsterrantrule-makingand an attempt to furtherincrease bureaucraticefficiency,
whereas little was accomplishedin policy reorientation.A key difficulty in overhauling
regulatory policies in China is the extremely insularpolicymaking process, where
policy development falls entirely into the hands of specialised agencies. Not only is
legislative and judicial oversight over agency rule-making absent, Shenzhen's
experience also suggests that accountabilityhas been difficult to establish even within
the executive branch. This is due both to the weakness of internal monitoring
institutions and the limited concept of accountability the government employs. The
report concludes that incremental reform is possible to allow greater input into the
policymaking process and to impose greater accountability on that process, even if
robust legislative and judicialsupervision is not politically or institutionallyfeasible
in the nearfuture.
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the project.
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Introduction
At both the national and local levels, "reform of the evaluation and approval
system" - shenpi zhidu gaige - became a central preoccupation of the Chinese
state bureaucracy in 2001. A stream of announcements issued from the State
Council and its ministries concerning new measures taken to change the way
shenpi ("evaluation and approval") was conducted. Hardly a week went by
without media coverage of speeches by or interviews with officials and
scholars concerning the importance of the reform. At the same time, throughout China, local jurisdictions both well known and obscure highlighted their
shenpi reform efforts. To all appearances, a novel effort to transform the
Chinese administrative state was underway.'
What is the shenpi system, and what novelties does its reform introduce to
the policy and legal landscape? To give a full account of the nature and scope
of the shenpi system would be to give an account of the nature and history of
the Chinese administrative state operating under a planned economy.' Without undertaking such an endeavour, one could introduce the concept of shenpi
by reference to a piece of proposed national legislation which is currently
under review at the National People's Congress and intended to promote
shenpi reform. The Legislative Affairs Office (LAO) of the State Council has
drafted a national statute to govern xingzheng xuke ("administrative
permission"). In Chinese, xingzheng xuke and shenpi denote roughly the same
range of government activities.' A convention has developed to translate
the title of this statute as the "Administrative Licensing Law." What do the
term "licensing", and the imminent advent of the Administrative Licensing
Law, tell us about the nature of the shenpi system?
First, it should be noted that, as a translation, the term "licensing" has
been stretched to stand for a broader category of regulatory instruments than
it normally signifies. What members in this broad category have in common

I

See, for example, report of speech by Li Jiange, Vice-Chairman of the State Council Economic Institutional Reform Commission, at the Tianjin International Conference of Advisors to Mayors (28
Oct 2001), CCTV. See (n 20, n 23 and n 53 below).
2 For a recent account of the history of China's central planning economy and its reform, written by an
influential reform thinker, see Wu Jinglian, Contemporary Chinese Economic Reform: Strategy and Implementation [in Chinese] (Shanghai: Yuandong Publishing, 1999). For one of the few pieces of legal
scholarship on the history of shenpi, see Fang Liufang, "Administrative Monopoly and the Examination and Approval System for Companies" [in Chinese] (1992) 4 Zhongguo faxue (Chinese Legal
Studies) pp 55-64, 106.
3 The term "shenpi" has strong associations with the history of central planning. To this day, approval
or prior notice requirements internal to the government bureaucracy are also labelled "shenpi", in
addition to requirements imposed on outside parties. The origin of this use dates back to a time when
nothing fell outside the planning authority of the state - when there would have been no point in
distinguishing between what was internal and what was external to the state bureaucracy. In contrast
to this familiar piece of bureaucratic jargon, the term xingzheng xuke, coined by scholars of public
administration and administrative law in the 1980s, is less familiar.
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is that all impose some condition of prior approval by, or notice to, government authorities, whether or not they involve issuing documents called
"licenses". Under this broad understanding of "licensing", for example, if the
products of a manufacturer - who is already, let us suppose, "licensed" to
engage in the relevant line of production - need to be inspected by a governmental body before being sold in the market, then the inspection itself
constitutes a "licensing" procedure. It is only in this expanded and perhaps
unintuitive sense of "licensing" that the term comes close to capturing the
range of activities denoted by xingzheng xuke or shenpi.
Secondly, though more than just the issuing of licenses, xingzheng xuke or
shenpi may still seem to be too narrow a category - relative to all of the possible regulatory instruments that a modem administrative state might employ
- to be the subject of a foundational piece of administrative law legislation.
Yet that is precisely what the Administrative Licensing Law intends to be just as shenpi reform was intended in 2001 to be a radical course of government reform. The reason for this is that shenpi possessed a prominence under
the centrally planned economy that would be inconceivable within a market
economy. Aside from interventions in the management decisions of state
sector enterprises, the government relied heavily on the imposition of rigid
requirements prior to the undertaking of any public and private initiatives in
order to direct the course of economic and social activities. To the extent the
government of a central planning economy can be said to be engaging in
regulation at all, shenpi was in a way the Chinese government's only regulatory instrument. As the Chinese state now prepares to take on a mainly
regulatory - as opposed to central planning - role, it must shed many of its

traditional shenpi operations and reshape those that remain to be consistent
with market institutions. Because so many government agencies at different
levels face this task of transformation, an administrative law statute (the
Administrative Licensing Law) generally applicable across substantive sectors was felt to be in order, as was a comprehensive reform campaign in public
administration (namely shenpi reform).'
Distinctions between different kinds of reforms of public administration
must also be made to capture the novelty of shenpi reform. Reform campaigns
aimed at government bureaucracies have been continuous in China since the
early 1990s. For example, the government has sought to eliminate arbitrary
exercises of official discretion and make the bureaucracy more rule-bound by
codifying procedures and enforcing administrative discipline more strictly. It
has endeavoured to improve the quality of the civil service. In the most

4

Because of the difficulty of using western legal terms to capture the unusual conceptual and hiscorical
connotations of shenpi, this report refrains from translating shenpi reform as "hcensing reform" and
retains the Chinese term instead - to save the reader from having to constantly read the term "licensmen"back into its Chinese context.
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publicised effort, it has stepped up prosecution of corruption. Many of these
reform measures serve a common end, namely to improve bureaucratic performance and, thereby, the government's reputation, in the day-to-day
operations of the state. Indeed, reducing corruption, improving government
"work style" and efficiency, and "standardising" administrative behaviour have
become fairly entrenched goals for state agencies. By contrast, shenpi reform,
at least as conceived by some of its proponents, raises broader questions about
the very policies that the government pursues, not just the bureaucratic procedures adopted in policy implementation.' For example, shenpi reform
proposes to reduce government regulation where market mechanisms and
self-regulation by non-governmental agents are sufficient to secure the desired social outcome. It also advocates devoting greater resources to regulatory
instruments other than shenpi. As will be elaborated in detail in the following
report, the implementation of these new principles ultimately requires reform of the existing policymaking process, not just the quality of bureaucratic
management. Even if in some policy contexts, shenpi reform calls for a course
of deregulation, the call does not announce merely a blind drive to cut red
tape, but new principles according to which all future regulatory tasks are to
be performed.
The distinction between the goals of improving bureaucratic management
and of improving the quality of policymaking, on which distinction shenpi
reform's claim to novelty is based, will be a major theme of this report, which
depicts and comments on shenpi reform from the perspective of one jurisdiction,
that of the city of Shenzhen. As is well known, Shenzhen is an unusual city in
having developed as one of China's Special Economic Zones (SEZ), among
which it is regarded as by far the most successful. 6 The city's stunning economic prosperity has put the local administration in an enviable position:
the city government is very well financed, and its civil service is able to attract well-educated and competent people to its ranks. Being designated a
Special Economic Zone also means that the Shenzhen Municipal Government' and the Shenzhen legislature enjoy important privileges in policymaking
and legislation. The Shenzhen People's Congress and its Standing Committee,
for example, have been granted authority to promulgate local statutes (difang

5 See accompanying text (n 42 below). The statement of these principles also took a prominent place
in early chapters of recent drafts of the Administrative Licensing Law.
6 See Wu, Weiping, PioneeringEconomic Reform in China's Special Economic Zones: The Promotion of
Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 1999).
7 The structure of the municipal level of government entities and the place for the Municipal Government in it, is discussed in the first section below.
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fagui),' a power normally vested in provincial legislatures.' Similarly, the
Shenzhen Municipal Government possesses mandate to enact local regulations (difang zhengfu guizhang),o a prerogative to which only administrations
in cities of recognised importance can lay claim.
Armed with these legislative instruments since the early 1990s, Shenzhen
has undertaken, either of its own initiative or under instructions from the
national government, a long list of highly prominent policy experiments,
particularly in the economic arena." In comparison to its history of economic legislation, the city's record of experimenting with unconventional
forms of public administration is rather meager," but by no means blank.
In 1997, for example, Shenzhen implemented a first round of shenpi reform,
through which it was claimed over 40 per cent of the city government's
shenpi requirements were eliminated. 3 This was four years before shenpi reform had come onto government agendas more widely across the nation.
Shenzhen's second round of shenpi reform, in 2001, forms the subject of
the major portion of this report. As a test case, Shenzhen's experience can
shed a great deal of light on the wider implementation of the Administrative
Licensing Law that can be expected in China in the next few years. While
Shenzhen's successes in shenpi reform may not be replicated everywhere else,
we know that its failures cannot be blamed on the lack of resources or official
ineptitude. Instead, such failures bring institutional and political constraints
on the reform into clear relief.
The anatomy of Shenzhen's reform given in this report leads to three
major findings. First, while government leaders in Shenzhen clearly took
the cue that shenpi reform was to embrace new principles of regulatory
policymaking (such as that the role of government should be reduced where

8 Because Shenzhen's local statutes are not allowed to conflict with the local statutes of the Guangdong
province, the former are subject to the approval of the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress
before enactment. However, in the absence of such conflicts, approval is routinely granted.
9 Moreover, the Shenzhen legislature can enact Special Economic Zone statutes (teqii fagui) in areas
involving special policy experiments, to apply within the Shenzhen SEZ (which geographically is a
sub-part of the city of Shenzhen). See "Rules on the Making of Statutes and Regulations in Shenzhen"
[in Chinese] (23 July 2001), Shenzhen People's Congress Standing Committee Notice No. 23, Ch 2.
10 In the rest of this report, the following conventions are adopted for translating the types of national
and local legislation and rule-making recognised in China's Legislation Law: (a) statutes, decisions,
and decrees of the National People's Congress are "Laws" (falti, note capitalisation); (b) State Council regulations, decisions, and decrees are "administrative regulations" (xingzhengfagui); (c) the State
Council's ministries' regulations are "ministerial regulations" (bumen guizhang); (d) statutes, decisions,
and decrees of provincial and authorised municipal legislatures are "local statutes" (difangfagui); and
(e) regulations of competent provincial and municipal People's Governments are "local regulations"
(difang zhengfu guizhang).
" These range from loosening currency exchange controls, relative liberalisation of ownership and use
of land, and the creation of a stock exchange in the early days of the city's development, to continuing changes in corporate and securities regulations today, to an upcoming interest rate liberalisation.
12 This is true, even in comparison with a small number of other municipalities in China, including
most notably, the city of Shunde in the nearby Pearl River Delta.
13 See accompanying text (nn 14-16 below).
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market mechanisms suffice, or that greater resources should be devoted to
post-shenpi regulation), commitment to implementing these principles was
extremely low. Although the city government purportedly achieved a large
reduction in the number of shenpi procedures, there were few indications
that reported figures reflected significant policy changes, and every indication that government agencies accomplished these reductions by merely
trimming office procedures. For the most part, shenpi reform blended
seamlessly into other efforts to improve bureaucratic efficiency. The first
section of this article will detail Shenzhen's conservative reform strategies
that belied the progressive rhetoric of the reform, whereas the second section illustrates how Shenzhen officials were much more willing to promote
innovations when pursuing the more traditional goal of improving bureaucratic management.
Second, a major reason for the short-circuiting of shenpi reform in Shenzhen
seems to be the tight institutional constraints under which the reform
proceeded. The most obvious sign of these constraints was the lack of any
attempt within the reform to involve the legislature or the judiciary in achieving improvements in regulatory policymaking. This, of course, is consistent
with the long-standing weakness of judicial review, legislative supervision, or
any other form of external monitoring of agency rule-making in China. But
there are more subtle institutional constraints as well. While it is generally
accepted that, in China, few opportunities are given to those outside the executive branch to challenge policy decisions made by government agencies,
what is much less commonly observed is how few opportunities for challenging policy decisions exist even for those inside the executive branch. The
third section offers evidence supporting this observation, by showing that
internal bureaucratic discipline tends to be based on monitoring rulecompliance, instead of on performance or policy review, and that within the
municipal executive branch, the offices charged with reviewing policy are illpositioned to do so. As a result, policymaking generally devolves entirely into
the hands of the specialised agencies themselves (often at the municipal bureau level). Ironically, the drive for shenpi reform partly sprang from frustrations
with the distortions government agencies can inflict on policy outcomes, yet
during 2001 in Shenzhen, the reform quickly succumbed to the same institutional gridlock that generally perverts the policymaking process.
Third, there is evidence that, in the near future, reform of the policymaking
process will continue to focus on tightening control of agency rule-making by
the leaders of the executive branch. This evidence comes from the organisation
of shenpi reform itself as well as from related legal developments in 2001 both in
Shenzhen (discussed in the fourth section of this article) and in the national
level at the State Council (discussed in the fifth section). Given this clear
political preference, on the part of the Chinese government, for internal as
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opposed to external monitoring, it is worthwhile for legal scholars to carefully
examine legal mechanisms that could strengthen executive control of agency
rule-making. In this vein, the fifth section takes a step back from the Shenzhen
context and highlights a number of provisions in current Chinese administrative law potentially relevant to strengthening internal monitoring. While
internal monitoring can by no means substitute for the public participation
afforded by judicial review and legislative supervision, there is also no reason to
regard it as trivial either, especially in the absence of immediate possibilities for
democratizing the policymaking process.

Shenzhen's Shenpi Reform in 2001: Reducing the Scope of Shenpi
Authority
Shenzhen implemented a first round of shenpi reform in 1997, thereby becoming the first jurisdiction in China to attempt reform of this kind. In 1998, the
mayor issued Decree No.83,'I which contained eight short clauses stating the
principles of the reform, and an appendix of close to 100 pages listing various
shenpi procedures in over 30 municipal bureaus and offices that had either been
eliminated, combined, or retained." An overall reduction of 42.4 per cent in
the number of shenpi procedures was reported. The origin of the 1997-1998
reform and the process by which it was carried out are unclear. What is known
is that the reform commenced after the inauguration of a new Standing Committee of the city government in 1996. The new city leaders spoke at that time
of "rebuilding Shenzhen": that is, the city would try to sustain its rapid growth,
and remain competitive, by embracing different policy strategies than those it
had relied on before. Improved government management was to be among the
new core strategies. Whether or not the 1997-1998 reform was driven by motives special to Shenzhen's local government, it has made Shenzhen into an
object of attention among Chinese government officials responsible for designing shenpi reform in 2001. The State Council's Legislative Affairs Office (LAO),
for example, has repeatedly requested information from Shenzhen's Legislation
Bureau on the city's reform experience."

14 "Regulations on the Reform of Shenzhen's Shenpi System" [in Chinese], in Shenzhen Legislation

'5
16

Bureau, Collection of New Statutes and Regulations of the Shenzhen SpecialEconomic Zone 1999 (Shenzhen:
Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2000), pp 181-182. Translated as Appendix One to this report.
Ibid., pp 182-275.
According to staff members of the LAO, the deputy chief of the Shenzhen Legislation Bureau made
a presentation on the subject to the LAO in 2000. In Oct 2001, the Legislation Bureau again made a
presentation on shenpi reform to the LAO at a teleconference. The text of the presentation (hereinafter
"Teleconference Presentation Text") was published in Shenzhen SEZ Daily (Shenzhen reqi bao) on 25
Oct 2001.
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By the end of the year 2000 and the beginning of 2001, Shenzhen was planning a second round of shenpi reform. The mayor's goal this time was to
accomplish a 30 per cent cut in the total number of shenpi procedures. Official
commentary on why a second round of reform was felt to be necessary has been
scant. One internal government document claims that, despite the "salient
accomplishments" of the 1997-1998 round, "there [were] still too many activities for which shenpi was required, the procedures of shenpi [were] still often
onerous and time-consuming, and the whole process [was] still inefficient." This
was the result of "many factors" ranging from "the current framework for administrative management, vested interests of the agencies, [to] traditional
ways of thinking."" Another government report points to the "lack of precedents to rely on" as a cause of the earlier reform's deficiencies, though it does
not explain in what specific ways government reform had "fallen behind the
development of general conditions." Indeed, there does not seem to have
been any study of why the earlier reform failed to achieve all of its goals.
Moreover, no official explanation has been given of what kind of slack was
left by the earlier reform, which purportedly had cut shenpi procedures by
over 40 per cent, such that a further 30 per cent reduction was thought achievable in 2001. As we shall see, devices absent from the 1997-1998 round of
shenpi reform were adopted in 2001 to ensure more thorough implementation.
But these devices were few and fairly rudimentary, and clearly did not add up
to a new reform strategy.
Nonetheless, in 2001 Shenzhen officials saw shenpi reform as an "important point of breakthrough [in transforming] the traditional system of
administrative management,"" portraying it as involving "thorough adjustment in the distribution of prerogatives and interests among government
agencies," and as "complex and difficult".20 Moreover, the Shenzhen government enjoyed significant discretion about how to push through the reform,
because, at least as of the end of 2000, the reform still had the character of a
local initiative to "enhance the investment environment." One government
aide 2 1 agreed that, in this regard, shenpi reform could be contrasted with the

17 Center for Research on Shenzhen's Economy (Research Institute for Integrated Development), "Imple-

mentation Plan for Deepening Shenzhen's Government Shenpi Reform" [in Chinese] (2001),
manuscript on file with author (hereinafter "Implementation Plan").
18 Teleconference Report Text (n 16 above). One important development after 1999 was the increasing
certainty that China would join the WTO.
19 "Implementation Plan" (n 17 above), s 3 ("Organization, Leadership, and Procedures for Deepening
Shenpi Reform").
20 Ibid. The drafters of the Administrative Licensing Law at the State Council LAO have spoken of
their work in similar terms. One example is comments then LAO chief Yang Jingyu made in Apr
2001 at a workshop held at the Yale Law School.
21 Personal interview, Shenzhen, Sept 2001.
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campaign of "government restructuring",22 which Shenzhen embarked upon
in July 2001. The latter was carried out under instructions from the State
Council and the national Party leadership, and its blueprint was drawn in
negotiation with the national and provincial governments. In contrast, although the State Council began at the end of 2001 to promote a standardised
version of shenpi reform across China," this came after Shenzhen's second
round of shenpi reform had already reached completion.

The Political Process
In February 2001, the Shenzhen city government announced the start of a
campaign to "accelerate" government operations (tisu), which was to last
throughout the year. The "acceleration" campaign heralded the new round
of shenpi reform by including the reduction of government shenpi activities
on its agenda. Fifteen bureaus published "pledges to the public" at that
time, some of which announced immediate or proposed cuts in the number
of shenpi procedures that they individually conducted. However, a distinction between the "acceleration" campaign and shenpi reform was generally
maintained. The former was a collection of miscellaneous initiatives by individual agencies intended to improve government efficiency. Although these
initiatives all contributed to bettering Shenzhen's investment environment
and were thus encouraged by the mayor, the individual bureaus had primary
say in their design and execution. By contrast, shenpi reform was more formal,
and aimed at changing the scope of government activities through quasilegislative means. The city's central leadership was involved - in the form of
a special task force - and one single goal was paramount: the reduction of
shenpi procedures by 30 per cent.
To explain the political process by which shenpi reform was carried out, a
brief sketch of the organisational and decision-making structure of Shenzhen's
city government is necessary. The city government is headed by a mayor who
is also the deputy Party Secretary of the city. He is joined by seven other deputy
mayors to form the Standing Committee of the city government,2 5 the central
decision-making body in the administration. (Whenever a Shenzhen official
document, such as a local regulation, speaks simply of the "Municipal
22 Xingzhengjigou gaige. The relation between shenpi reform and "government restructuring" is further

discussed below. See accompanying text (nn 54-62 below).

23 Cf for instance, the Ministry of Supervision, the (State Council) Legislative Affairs Office, the (State

Council) Economic Institutional Reform Commission, and the Central Government Staffing
Commission, Suggestions Concerning the Implementation of the Administrative Shenpi Reform [in Chinese]
(2001/10/18), State Council (2001) Document 33; State Council Shenpi Reform Leading Group,
Several Problems in the Implementation of the Five Principlesof Shenpi Reform [in Chinese] (2001/12/21),
State Council Shenpi Reform Leading Group (2001) Document 1.
24 The "acceleration" campaign and its relation to shenpi reform are discussed in greater detail in the
second section of this article.
25 Shithengfu changwn huiyi. A list of Shenzhen's top political leaders is available at http://www.sz.gov.
cn/2-cy/.
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Government", it refers to the Municipal Government Standing Committee.
This usage is adopted throughout this report, especially because distinguishing
between the Municipal Government Standing Committee and the municipal
level bureaus is crucial). The deputy mayors divide among themselves the task
of overseeing a large number of bureaus engaged in substantive areas of
regulation, service provision, and law enforcement."6 Typically, the specialised
bureaus report not only to the mayor, but also to bureaucratic superiors in the
province and at the national level. Most of the bureaucratic protocols each
agency executes tend to be determined not by city policy, but according to
provincial or national instructions.27 There is thus a structural divide between
the specialised bureaus, on the one hand, and the central administration of
the city headed by the mayor, on the other. By contrast, another small group
of bureaus and permanent offices works directly for the mayor on general policy
and organisational issues. They can be conceived as being part of the city's
central administration, functioning as staff offices assisting the mayor. Temporary offices are also sometimes set up by the city leadership during particular
campaigns and have the character of task forces."
In shenpi reform, it was the specialised bureaus whose regulatory authority
was under review, while it was the city's central administration pushing for
reform. In 2001, a "Shenpi Reform Leading Group" was formed, headed by
mayor Yu Youjun and deputy mayor Li Decheng and nominally comprising
bureau chiefs and district government directors. The Leading Group possessed
a temporary staff office ("Shenpi Reform Staff Office"), which operated out of
the permanent Economic Institutional Reform Office (EIRO, or "tigaiban").
The Staff Office carried out the detailed work of reviewing the shenpi activities of the bureaus, and its personnel came from EIRO, the Legislation Bureau
(fazhiju), the Staffing Office (bianzhi ban)," and the Bureau of Administrative Supervision (jianchaju). However, it was mainly the EIRO that the mayor
relied on for planning and coordinating the shenpi reform in both 1998 and
2001. In 2001, the Center for Research on Shenzhen's Economy, a small research group that is part of an official think-tank called the Research Institute
for Integrated Development,3 0 also submitted reform proposals that were taken
seriously by the mayor.
At the start of the reform process, each bureau was ordered to take stock of
the shenpi work it had been doing, and to design ways of reducing that work by
at least 30 per cent. The bureaus then each submitted a report on what shenpi
26 A chart of bureaus and offices is available at http://www.sz.gov.cn/3-jg/. An English version of the

same is available at http://www.sz.gov.cn/english/agency/office c/200112280020.htm.
27 The local government's main role is to finance and determine the personnel of these agencies.
Z8 This report does not discuss the district, township, and neighbourhood levels of government administration and their relation to the city government.
29 This office operates out of the Personnel Bureau (renshiju).
30 Zonghe fazhan yanjiu suo, Shenzhen jingji yanjiu zhongxin.
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authority they possessed, the legal and policy bases of such authority, and what
the proposed cuts would consist of." A disincentive for under-reporting was
put in place by stipulating that shenpi procedures not reported would automatically be abolished. The reports and supporting documents so submitted were
then reviewed by the Shenpi Reform Staff Office. On the basis of this review,
teams within the Staff Office (corresponding to the distinct government entities - such as EIRO and the Legislation Bureau - that contributed personnel)
then made independent recommendations to the Leading Group further modifying each bureau's proposal. Thereafter the Leading Group proceeded to
convene government-wide meetings with bureau representatives, where extensive negotiations were carried out on the basis of the reports and
recommendations. The same process, presumably on a much smaller scale, took
place at the same time at the district government and township / neighbourhood
administration levels.
Proposals and recommendations regarding reform measures began to trickle
in to the mayor's office in March and April 2001. Initially, a deadline for the
reform seemed to have been set at the end of June: the timing suggests that
the intention was to complete the reform before "government restructuring"
was to begin in July. As it turned out, at least at the municipal level, neither
the review of shenpi authority nor the negotiations for its modification were
finished by July 2001. As late as August, the Bureau of Administrative
Supervision, which took part in the work of the Shenpi Reform Staff Office,
was quoted in one news article as saying: "Some bureaus submitted reports of
their shenpi activities that are at substantial variance with what could have
been expected from the results of the 1998 reform, and it is difficult to know
which parts of the reports are accurate and which are not."" This suggests
that the Bureau of Administrative Supervision had not yet been able to complete its review task.
In terms of organisation, the 2001 reform saw a number of improvements
over its 1997-1998 predecessor. Most important, the mayor enlisted more offices from the central administration to help carry out the reform. During the
1997-1998 round, the only office (aside from the bureaus whose administrative
authority had been under review) that had participated significantly in the
design and execution of the reform had been EIRO. The Legislation Bureau, by
contrast, had been brought in only at the last minute. Its team had been given
a mere 10 days to review documents from various bureaus. Moreover, the information contained in those documents had been extremely poor: often only the
titles of shenpi procedures were given, without descriptions of the nature and

31 Cf "Implementation Plan" (n

17 above), s 3.
32 "Room for Improvement in the 'Acceleration' Campaign" [in Chinese] (undated, posted on Shenzhen
Government On-line, http://www.sz.govemment.cn, on 28 Aug 2001), Shenthen SEZ Daily.
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legal basis of these procedures." Finally, the Legislation Bureau had not taken
part in negotiations with individual bureaus on what cuts in shenpi procedures
to adopt." Things were quite different in 2001: the Legislation Bureau as well
as the Bureau of Administrative Supervision were brought into the reform process from the start, and, to make their participation possible, the mayor requested
the bureaus under review to submit supporting documents, providing details
about the legal bases for the shenpi procedures reported."
Shenzhen officials participating in shenpi reform often did not hesitate to
depict it as a somewhat adversarial process. They spoke of the bureaus whose
shenpi activities were questioned as infected - at least at times - by "factional
and cliquish interests."36 Some claimed that bureau officials, particularly those
senior both in age and rank, tended to resist the reform. Others reported that,
at the government-wide meetings where shenpi reduction was negotiated, the
deputy mayors tended to take the side of the bureaus whose work they oversaw.
Moreover, because the goal of the reform was stated in terms of a 30 per cent
quota, each bureau had an interest in over-reporting the number of procedures currently in existence. To do this, some bureaus concocted procedures
that did not in fact exist; others dug up procedures which had long been
defunct. When queried why these procedures had not appeared on the list of
shenpi procedures published in 1999,37 the bureaus offered all kinds of excuses.
The Bureau of Administrative Supervision was reported as claiming: "Some
bureaus simplified internal administrative procedures for certain shenpi tasks,
eliminated a few steps therein, and went on to misreport such changes as
abolishing the relevant shenpi requirement altogether. Some bureaus even
reported as newly abolished shenpi procedures that had already been abolished before this year [in order to comply with the mayor's requirement]."'
In short, a variety of tactics for maintaining turf could be observed on the
part of the bureaus.
If the bureaus' positions were not unbiased, nor was the Shenpi Reform
Staff Office's position privileged. None of the government entities that contributed personnel to that office - EIRO, the Legislation Bureau, the municipal

Personal interview with Legislation Bureau (LB) official, July 2001. The official said that because of
these difficulties, the LB refused in 1998 to take responsibility for the final product of the campaign
- the government document eventually published as the appendix to Decree No.83. Cf (n 15 above).
This may seem surprising, in light of the fact that the LB, as a general matter, negotiates with individual agencies on legislative drafting.
3 However, the degree of cooperation among the teams that formed the Shenpi Reform Staff Office
seemed minimal. For example, although the approaches the Legislation Bureau and the Bureau of
Supervision took to their tasks were quite similar, the two bureaus had no regular communication.
Similarly, the Center for Research on Shenzhen's Economy, although undertaking similar policy
research as the Economic Institutional Reform Office (EIRO), rarely collaborated with EIRO. Interview with member of the Center for Research on Shenzhen's Economy, Sept 2001.
36 See "Implementation Plan" (n 17 above).
3 See accompanying text (n 15 above).
38 "Room for Improvement in 'Acceleration' Campaign" (n 32 above).
3
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Staffing Office, and the Bureau of Administrative Supervision - has regular
contact with the bureaus that conduct shenpi, or familiarity with the substantive regulatory issues. Indeed, information about the bureaus' shenpi activities
was, for the most part, coming to them for the first time. Yet the goal of 30 per
cent reduction was a given from the outset. The task of the Staff Office must
have been reduced to mere browbeating of the bureau officers at times.
These conflicting perspectives were complicated by the fact that Shenzhen's
"igovernment restructuring", which was looming in the spring of 2001 and
was finally launched in July, meant that most bureaus were expecting an imminent personnel cut of up to 20 per cent. In fact, a number of the bureau
chiefs expected to leave their jobs due to government restructuring,39 and a
number of bureaus were due to be eliminated or merged. Shenzhen's government agencies were thus effectively asked to sharply reduce their respective
scope of authority, improve performance, and organise a large personnel change
all at the same time. It was apparently sometimes thought that imposing these
multiple demands on the bureaus demonstrated the government's resolve for
reform: shenpi reform was a kind of "revolution" the government visited upon
itself. This aggressive rhetoric, however, is belied by the serious extent to
which the central administration relied on the specialised bureaus for the
design and implementation of policy. Without the cooperation of the bureaus,
no policy content could be given to the quota the mayor proposed.

The Substance of Shenpi Reductions
One might well expect that a 30 per cent reduction in the government's shenpi
procedures would involve substantial changes to existing regulatory policies. In
the design of shenpi reform, Shenzhen officials approached such potential policy
adjustments in the following manner. First, they drew up a list of policy areas a list that was relatively large though not exhaustive - in which government
regulation was regarded as prima facie justifiable.40 They then enumerated a
number of principles that would limit the scope of the government's shenpi
authority even within these areas. For example, it had been suggested that shenpi
procedures should be dispensed with if existing market mechanisms rendered
them redundant; that, when "intermediary organisations" (zhongjie zuzhi) ,
through self-regulation and other activities, could be entrusted to produce the
same desired benefits that government shenpi procedures intended to achieve,

3 There is evidence that it was not just the less qualified government employees who left their jobs as
a result of personnel reductions in government restructuring. Some very competent managers also
took the opportunity to leave, as long as they could secure civil servant benefits.
4 Center for Research on Shenzhen's Economy (Research Institute for Integrated Development), "Reform the Government Shenpi System, Stimulate the Growth of Shenzhen's Economy" [in Chinese]
(2001), manuscript on file with author (hereinafter "Stimulate Growth"), s 3.1.
41 In the context of shenpi reform this term usually refers to government-organised non-governmental
organisations (GONGOs).
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the government should abolish the corresponding shenpi procedures; that shenpi
requirements - that is, requirements of prior notice to and / or approval by the
government - should be eliminated when post-shenpi regulation was both necessary and sufficient; that shenpi procedures that effectively granted applicants
monopoly rights should employ auction- or lottery-like procedures; and that
the government should reduce its interference, in the form of shenpi requirements,
with the autonomy of enterprises.42
With respect to some of these abstract principles of the reform, Shenzhen
officials were able to make more specific recommendations for implementation.
This tended to be the case when the government had already been pursuing
some policy of deregulation independent of shenpi reform per se. For example,
throughout the 1990s, the regulation of the formation and operation of companies was gradually relaxed. As a result of this deregulatory policy, shenpi
reformers were able to state clearly the limited scope of shenpi procedures in
this sphere.43 The question, though, remained as to how shenpi reform ought
to be conducted when there wasn't a ready-made deregulatory policy to
implement. In this more general case, how could the fairly abstract principles
of reform be translated into concrete recommendations in the context of the
specific activities of specific bureaus? 4
Since the principles that the reformers appealed to raise questions concerning the appropriateness of government regulation as compared to the
alternatives of market allocation or private self-regulation, they touch on fundamental issues of institutional design. One would thus expect those who
reviewed the proposals of individual bureaus to examine carefully the rationality of the agencies' policies and procedures. Moreover, since responsible
rationality review requires the reviewers to have adequate information and
the capacity for policy research, one would have expected the Shenpi Reform
Staff Office to make preparations for the challenges of such information gathering and research. In fact, however, the Shenpi Reform Staff Office relied
much more on a different approach to their task, which was to review the
legality of bureau procedures.
This legalistic approach to shenpi reform was composed of two basic
strategies. The first was to find legal grounds for categorically declaring certain bureau rules and procedures for shenpi invalid, and to subsequently
eliminate these rules and procedures. This could be done in at least a couple
of ways. One was to appeal to a national policy regarding the power of legislation and rule-making to authorise several significant types of administrative

42 Ibid., s 3.2; "Implementation Plans" (n 17 above), s 2.1.
3 "Stimulate Growth" (n 40 above), s 3.2.3
4 Shenpi reform, after all, is supposed to be about a comprehensive readjustment of the role of the
government in relation to the new economy, and thus to be distinct from the government's piecemeal retreat from select sectors of the economy, a retreat that China has been witnessing for years.
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action. According to this policy, 4 the power to authorise government entities to impose administrative penalties, conduct licensing, collect fees, and
enforce certain legal obligations on citizens is reserved for higher levels of
government and withheld from other, lower-level government entities.
Generally, at the level of local government, the authorising entity is required
to possess the power to make local statutes (difang fagui) or regulations
(guizhang) according to the Legislation Law. In a city like Shenzhen, only the
city government - the central administration headed by the mayor - and the
city's legislature possess such power, whereas municipal-level bureaus, district
governments, and so on, do not. Therefore, according to the policy in question,
municipal bureaus can never create, but can only implement, shenpi procedures.
Enforcement of this policy would mean that any shenpi procedure for which a
legal basis could not be found in local statutes or regulations or in still higher
legal authority would be voided.
A different basis for declaring bureau rules categorically invalid is if they
conflict with superior laws or regulations. Instead of appealing to the policy
about who can authorise particularly significant types of government actions,
this tactic appeals to a more general legal principle, namely that conflicts of
law are to be resolved in favour of the law that has higher authority. This
principle, of course, is so basic that, in any reasonably well functioning legal
system, one would expect it to be realised through routine enforcement mechanisms (eg through the judiciary) and not through periodic "reforms". The
fact that it is considered a major component of the current shenpi reform reveals,
rather starkly, the weakness of basic mechanisms for enforcing law against
local government agencies in China.
The second basic legalistic strategy for shenpi reform is not to declare agency
rules and procedures categorically invalid, but to force their revision through
narrow constructions of the laws and regulations that authorise them, with
the ultimate aim of eliminating shenpi procedures. Shenzhen's reformers elaborated this strategy in their proposals.46 It can be applied, for example, when
national or provincial law explicitly requires some minimal form of registration,
while a local agency uses this as a basis to impose stronger forms of shenpi
requirements (thus giving the agency more substantial discretion). Or it might
be that national or provincial law only requires that an agency participate in
the regulation of certain affairs, without being specific about the means of
regulation. This again might have been used as justification to institute shenpi.

45 The policy is widely known, although it is unclear where its original source lies. It is embodied in the
Administrative Penalty Law and drafts of the Administrative Licensing Law, as well Shenzhen's
"Rules Regarding the Management of the Normative Documents of Administrative Agencies", discussed in the fourth section of this article. (See n 128 below). See also Shenzhen Legislation Bureau,
Recommendations Regarding Nine Types of Codificationfor Administrative Actions [in Chinese] (2001),
document on file with the author.
4 "Stimulate Growth" (n 40 above), s 3.2.
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One difference between this strategy and the first (invalidating agency
rules) is that, in the process of narrowly construing higher laws and regulations,
the reviewers of bureau procedures would naturally pay attention to the rationality of regulatory policies and instruments. This is because they would have
to consider alternatives to shenpi requirements for implementing the same
higher regulation, and issues of the feasibility and reasonableness of the alternatives would arise. By contrast, invalidating bureau rules and procedures
does not by itself require one to consider the purposes the rules and procedures might have served. Even if the rules were truly important to a bureau's
work, they could be overturned if they were, strictly speaking, illegal. A second difference between the two strategies follows from the first: because the
strategy of invalidation, unlike that of narrow construction, does not require
one to take account of what rules, legally enacted, are likely to replace those
invalidated, it is a more convenient toot for producing the appearance of a
large reduction in shenpi procedures.
Shenzhen's reliance on the review of legality of bureau rules for shenpi
reform was made inevitable virtually from the start, because the bureaus only
needed to submit supporting documents detailing the legal bases of the shenpi
procedures they sought to retain, demonstrating their compliance with higher
laws and regulations, and did not have to supply any written explanation of
the policy justification of these procedures. Moreover, although there is no
published information about the respective extent to which the two distinct
legalistic strategies were deployed, one might infer that the strategy of invalidation was favoured, because the reform process was heavily driven by the 30
per cent quota. One Legislation Bureau official said in July 2001 that the
bureau was primarily relying on review of legality to attain the desired percentage of reduction. As long as this was feasible, the bureau did not intend
to engage in further rationality review." Even the Centre for Research on
Shenzhen's Economy, which, as a policy think-tank, ought to have had a
broader range of issues in view than the enforcement of superior regulations,
saw legality review as the main instrument of shenpi reform." Another Legislation Bureau official said during an interview that, earlier in the 2001 reform,
the team from EIRO (an institution generally focused on policy research) at
the Shenpi Reform Staff Office delivered a reform recommendation that led
to only a 10 per cent cut in shenpi procedures. The mayor then relied more on
the Legislation Bureau team (composed entirely of lawyers), whereupon the
percentage of shenpi reduction moved higher."
By contrast, the attention given to rationality review was extremely meager.
Interviews with officials suggest that it was performed in a very informal
4

Peronal interview, Shenzhen, July 2001.

4

Personal interview, Shenzhen, Sept 2001.
interview, Shenzhen, July 2001.

4 Peranal
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fashion, taking place mainly during the government-wide meetings where
the Shenpi Reform Leading Group negotiated with individual bureaus about
reductions. At the meetings, members from the Shenpi Reform Staff Office
would "talk to the bureau representatives, get a feel for what the procedures
were for, and try to think about whether it was possible to do without the
procedure."5' There is no evidence that the Shenpi Reform Leading Group or
its Staff Office engaged in any significant policy review to translate the abstract principles of reform into concrete terms. Of course, it is possible that
the specialised bureaus themselves voluntarily re-examined and substantially
revised their policies during the first, internal review, stage of shenpi reform.
However, one would expect both their ability and motivation to do so to be
quite limited.
In one of Shenzhen's shenpi reform proposals, it was implied that the point
of adopting the reduction quota of 30 per cent as a reform goal was to "relieve
the government from onerous shenpi tasks."" This suggests an attractive conception of shenpi reform as consisting of two stages. During the first, the city's
chief executive (the mayor), aided by staff in his central administration, would
enforce higher laws and regulations strictly against the specialised bureaus. In
the second stage, the two sides would enter into a specific kind of negotiation:
on the one hand, the chief executive would re-authorise the bureaus to pursue certain shenpi activities; on the other, the bureaus would significantly
readjust their work according to the chief executive's reform agenda. The
appeal of this strategy for shenpi reform comes from the nature of the internal
divide within the local government. Generally, one could expect the bureaus
to drag their feet in regulatory reform because of their commitment to standard operating procedures. By contrast, the local chief executive could be
expected to be less committed to bureaucratic protocols, while he has more
to gain if he could demonstrate reform results. To the extent that resistance
to regulatory reform comes from lower levels of the bureaucratic apparatus,
therefore, the local chief executive can be thought of as a progressive force in
a reform campaign."

5o

[bid.

"Implementation Plan" (n 17 above), s 1.2.
52 One could try to he more explicit about the model of institutional behaviour here. The picture is that
local bureaus, in their regulatory activities, deploy procedures that are consistent with the instructions received from their bureaucratic superiors at the provincial and national levels. Yet the problem
is that the entire regulatory systems are in need of reform (ie not that instructions from bureaucratic
superiors are not followed). In this situation, the local chief executive, as an outsider to the regulatory bureaucracies, can play a positive role when granted a mandate to push for reform. An interesting
issue that may arise here is the chief executive's limited powers. For instance, he or she could not
simply fire bureau chiefs who dissent: any conflict with bureau chiefs would have to he mediated
through the local Party Committee, in which some bureaus may have a strong voice. This is somewhat analogous to how, in a presidential system, the chief executive's relations to agencies are mediated
by Congress.
5
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In light of this conception of how, ideally, shenpi reform would be
conducted, one could say that, in reality, Shenzhen's reform simply left out
the second stage (or, as will shortly become apparent, it replaced the second
stage with something else). The reform became a matter of a one-time and
massive enforcement effort that held agencies to existing regulations and laws,
but not to a new policy approach to regulation that has not - and could not
have - yet been codified. The extent to which shenpi reform's potential was
thereby compromised is obvious. To be sure, forcing agency compliance with
existing regulations and laws is a good thing. But if that were the goal, then
shenpi reform could only be regarded as a poor substitute for genuine legal
mechanisms for holding government agencies accountable. Shenpi reform itself offered a glaring demonstration of this last point. During the second half
of 2001, China's State Council organised shenpi reform among the national
ministries, with the result that a significant number of ministerial regulations
(with relevance to shenpi) were repealed." Presumably, this would in turn
affect what "legal bases" there are for the shenpi activities conducted by
Shenzhen's municipal level bureaus. The question of course then arises: how
are the bureaus going to be held accountable to these new changes in law?
Through a third round of shenpi reform a few years from now?
Shenpi Reform's Quiet End
In July 2001, massive changes began to sweep through Shenzhen's government branches as part of the "government restructuring" campaign."
Throughout the summer, it was hard to resist the impression that "restructuring" all but dwarfed shenpi reform in its impact on the city bureaucracy. The
politics of the campaign were quite different from the politics of shenpi reform.
Whereas the mayor took the initiative in the latter, aided in his task by a
group of lawyers and economists, the city's Party Secretary took the lead in
the former, aided by the entire Party apparatus at his disposal. Whereas the
2001 shenpi reform was a local experiment that, if successful, would lend experience to reformers at the national level and help national legislation, in
the "restructuring" campaign Shenzhen was merely following an agenda that
5

5

See "National Planning Commission Repeals Shenpi Requirements for Five Major Categories of Investment" [in Chinese] (7 Nov 2001), Xinhua News Agency; "Over One Thousand National Shenpi
Requirements Will Be Repealed" [in Chinese], China Youth Daily, date unspecified 2001. The need to
comply with WTO requirements has also prompted "house-cleaning" at national levels. See, for National Economic and Commerce Commission (NECC), "Index of INECCI Lapsed and Repealed
Ministerial Regulations" [in Chinese] (2001), NECC (2001) Order No.25; Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Commerce (MOFTEC), "Index of a Third Group of Repealed Documents" [in Chinese] (2001),
MOFTEC (2001) Order 32; and "State Council Decides to Repeal Certain Administrative Regulations" [in Chinese] (18 Oct 2001), CCTV, referring to "State Council's Decision to Repeal Certain
Administrative Regulations Promulgated Before 2000" [in Chinese] (2001), State Council Decree
No.319.
An official website is devoted to this government campaign, available at http://www.sz.gov.cn/13-zt/
zt4/default.htm.
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had already been implemented at the State Council level in 1998 and at
provincial levels in 1999."
The type of administrative reform "government restructuring" represents
is considerably less novel than shenpi reform. The earliest round of restructuring at the State Council level occurred in 1993,6 and Shenzhen itself
had witnessed restructuring of a greater or lesser scale on at least five previous occasions." The essence of "government restructuring" in China has
been the reduction of government size, as measured by the number of agencies and, more importantly, the size of the civil service. When personnel
reduction is the bottom line, the retirement of a large number of politically
well-connected career bureaucrats and party apparatchiks who regard themselves as entitled to official privileges becomes the central difficulty." And
since "restructuring" cannot bypass the speed at which different generations move through the civil service, it has been a necessarily incremental
reform process.
This is not to imply that there was little of note in Shenzhen's 2001 "government restructuring". Quite the contrary, it led to the promotion or
retirement of many executives and managers, assigned new executives to over
a dozen bureaus, and eliminated or recombined a number of bureaus. More
significantly, the Shenzhen government also took "restructuring" as an opportunity to pursue reform of its civil service, bringing fundamental changes
to the incentives offered to government employees." Nonetheless, personnel reduction remained the essential goal. To appreciate the difference between
the goals of "restructuring" and the goals of shenpi reform, one has only to
note that personnel reduction was applied not only to administrative agencies but also to Party offices, the local People's Congress and Political
Consultative Meetings, and the judicial and procuratorate systems."
As "restructuring" proceeded apace in Shenzhen, it highlighted something
that was lacking in shenpi reform: even though the purported goal of shenpi
reform was to reduce the scope of government regulatory activity in many
areas, 6 1 the reform could not deploy the instrument of government
reorganisation. That is, the internal structure, leadership, and personnel in
all the bureaus, offices, and their respective branches in lower jurisdictions

5
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5
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61

See Zhang Shengzu and Li Jian (eds), Manual on the Policy and Law of Government Restructuringand
Personnel Retirement [in Chinese] (Beijing: Legal Publishing, 1999).
See State Council General Office (Guowuyuan bangongtingmishuju), Organization and Departments of
the Central Government [in Chinese] (Beijing: China Development Publishing, 1995).
Legislation Bureau document on file with the author.
Zhang and Li (n 55 above), p 113.
An introduction to Shenzhen's ambitious civil service reform can be found at an official website
devoted to the topic, available at http://www.sz.gov.cn/13-zt/zt2/default.htm.
"Government Restructuring Proceeds Smoothly", [in Chinese], Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 23 Oct 2001.
One advocate said that the essence of the reform was a "redistribution of government prerogatives in
regulating economic affairs." Personal interview, Shenzhen, Sept 2001.
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(ie districts, townships, and neighbourhoods) would remain intact in so far as
shenpi reform was concerned. Far from a top-down rearrangement of government functions designed to achieve a more appropriate configuration of
government intervention in the economy, the reform was largely designed
and implemented by the agencies themselves. During the reform, some municipal bureaus voluntarily devolved administrative authority to lower branch
offices, but it was difficult to detect, either in intention or in actual result, a
redistribution of authority across different bureaus.
Intuitively, "restructuring" might have furnished the mayor with a tool to
take a hack at "vested interests" in the bureaus. In reality, however, the order
of priority was the other way around. According to one government aide, by
eliminating certain government functions first, shenpi reform paved the way
for "restructuring": simplified administrative procedures would make it harder
to justify keeping a large staff." By contrast, "restructuring" could only have
indirect effects on shenpi reform. For example, it might have happened that
some of the bureau executives who had previously resisted shenpi reform were,
for other reasons, replaced during "restructuring". And the newly sworn-in
bureau chiefs might have been more eager to support the mayor's initiative.
In effect, then, "government restructuring", and not substantive policy
review, became the second stage of shenpi reform, following the first stage of
legalistic, enforcement-oriented review of bureau procedures. With this
development, shenpi reform in Shenzhen was brought to a quiet end. On 22
October, the mayor signed a new decree, "Regulations Regarding the System
of Shenpi and Registration in Shenzhen", that signaled the conclusion of the
2001 reform.63 The decree announced the elimination of 277 shenpi procedures,
amounting to a reduction of 38 per cent. All that this number tells us, however,
is that by some method of measurement the reform had achieved its quantitative goal. What that method was or what assumptions it made - whether it

was based on compliance enforcement or substantive policy review, what types
of compliance enforcement might have been involved, and whether it took
into account the likelihood that a significant number of shenpi procedures
would be reinstituted - were matters about which there was official silence.
Moreover, since there was no way of knowing what amount of reduction was
appropriate relative to the diverse goals of different regulatory agencies, it is
62 Ibid. The same government aide ascribed the strategy of using restructuring to attack vested interests
to Premier Zhu Rongji, in the latter's management of the national government, and claimed that
Shenzhen's mayor self-consciously adopted a different tack, which was to chip away at the functions
of various agencies without eliminating the agencies themselves.
63 Translated as Appendix Two of this report.
6 An official news report answered the question, "How is the 2001 reform distinct from the 1997-1998
reform?" by naming two features of the 2001 reform: (a) that it was carried out in coordination with
the new round of "government restructuring"; and (b) that it was guided by new reform principles.
"City Cuts 277 Shenpi Items" [in Chinese], Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 24 Oct 2001. In terms of the analysis
offered in this subsection, (2) does not amount to an answer, while (1) amounts to a wrong answer.
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highly uncertain whether quantitative reductions of shenpi requirements reflect better policies. It might reflect success in cutting red tape, yet that is a
matter of improving bureaucratic management, not improving policies.
This last distinction is crucial to understanding the goal of shenpi reform.
As one participant in the reform put it, shenpi reform's basic aspiration is not
to improve the efficiency of the government, but to improve the efficiency of
the market."5 It would be a great mistake to understand the latter reductively
in terms of the former, because regulatory policies affect market efficiency
through all sorts of incentives, and not just through the magnitude of transactional cost incurred in dealing with government agencies. After all, there is
no sense in having the government strive to provide superior "service" if that
service implements an erroneous choice of regulatory instruments. Moreover,
as will be discussed more extensively in the third section of this article, the
main obstacle to improving the quality of regulatory policies in China is the
straitjacketed policymaking process: potential channels of public input through
judicial review and legislative supervision are usually unavailable, and even
in the executive branch, mechanisms that allow the chief policymakers to
monitor the evolution of policy implementation are woefully inadequate. By
contrast, although public input can sometimes help improve bureaucratic
management, its role is less essential, whereas other factors such as investment in government capacity exert equal or perhaps greater impact."6

Improving Government Performance in Shenpi Reform
Aside from the attempt to reduce the scope of government agencies' shenpi
authority, Shenzhen's officials attached a great premium to the improvement
65 Personal conversation with a member of Shanghai's People's Congress, Oct 2001.
66 One of the implications of the distinction between improving bureaucratic management and im-

proving policymaking emerged in scholarly discussions of the design of shenpi reform. The State
Council Legislative Affairs Office, in drafting the Administrative Licensing Law, has been interested
in learning from American regulatory expertise. The question thus arose: which part of the history of
the development of government regulation in America would be most relevant for the Chinese to
study? If shenpi reform's main focus were to be on improving government performance and reputation,
then its closest analogue in the American experience would be the recent (and controversial)
National Performance Review, otherwise known as the campaign of "reinventing government", under the Clinton administration. See Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that
Works Better and Costs Less (Report of the National Performance Review, 1993); James Q. Wilson,
"Reinventing Public Administration", PS: PoliticalScience and Politics (December 1994), 667-673;
Jerry Mashaw, "Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse
of Administrative Law" (1996) 57 U Pitt L Review 405. If, by contrast, shenpi reform aims to change
the way regulatory policies are made, then the episodes of American regulatory reform that have the
greatest relevance would probably be: (a) the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in 1970; (b) the adoption of cost-benefit analysis as supervised by the Office of Management
and Budget; and (c) deregulatory experience in the Reagan era generally. For the historical
significance of NEPA, see Robert Rabin, "Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective" (1986) 38
Stan L Rev. 1189, 1284-1288.
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of government performance in carrying out shenpi procedures during 2001 67
At the beginning of the year, Shenzhen's City Government announced the
start of a campaign for "accelerating" government operations (tisu). As mentioned previously, the "acceleration" campaign differed from shenpi reform in
that it was intentionally, and not just inadvertently, a miscellaneous collection of individual agencies' initiatives for improving government efficiency.
The individual bureaus had primary say in designing and executing their respective parts of the campaign. Moreover, many of the measures for achieving
greater efficiency in administration were specific to the individual bureaus or
even to divisions within them, and could have been devised only by managers,
not by high-level policymakers. This again underscores the distinction between the goals of improving bureaucratic management and of substantive
regulatory reform. Nonetheless, Shenzhen officials have presented the more
important results from the "acceleration" campaigns as achievements in shenpi
reform. In September, the Shenzhen media began to report that, among the
15 bureaus that participated in the "acceleration" campaign, the time it took
to "do business" at these agencies was decreased by an average of 40 per cent."8
The report comports with a general impression that Shenzhen citizens have
enjoyed more efficient government administration of late. 9
One major strategy under this aspect of shenpi reform was to promote into
wider practice certain recent administrative innovations that did not originate in shenpi reform. A closer look at these innovations suggests that their
success is explained often not by short-term reform tactics but by longer-term
investments in building government capacity. Conversely, when long-term
investment in government capacity was absent, implementation of efficiencyenhancing measures was considerably less successful. This should immediately
give one pause: since at the starting point of shenpi reform, there is skepticism
about many current regulatory policies, which can then lead to questions
about the justifiability of even the existence of certain government agencies,
investing in government capacity cannot be the reform's chief strategy.
The example of one administrative technique that was especially promoted
in the "acceleration" campaign will illustrate this point.
67 Indeed, the draft Administrative Licensing Law itself has devoted extensive thought to the improve.

ment of bureaucratic procedure in the case-by-case administration of shenpi procedures. Cf State
Council Legislative Affairs Office, "Administrative Licensing Law" (December 2001 draft), document on file with author, Ch 5 and Ch 6.
68 "Half a Year of 'Acceleration' Achieves Results" [in Chinese], Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 10 Sept 2001;
"Acceleration' Demonstrates Results" [in Chinese], Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 15 Oct 2001.
69 See for example, "Business Community Evaluates 'Acceleration"' [in Chinese] (undated, posted on
Shenzhen Government On-line, http://www.sz.govemment.cn, on 28 Aug 2001), Shenzhen SEZ Daily;
"'Acceleration' Shows Results" [in Chinese], Shenzhen Commerce Daily, 17 Jan 2002. Periodic increases in the speed of bureaucratic operation are only apparent. In a different campaign, Shenzhen's
courts were asked to speed up the processing of cases, and this was achieved by getting court staff and
judges to work overtime, and by certain questionable practices (eg the Administrative Law Tribunal
was asked to process cases from the Civil Tribunal).
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An Example: "Window Service"
Few proposals for shenpi reform have failed to recommend, and few reports on
the achievements of the reform have failed to remark on, the use of "window
service" as a technique for improving government service.70 The protocol has
received such emphasis that it only falls short of being enshrined in legislation.
What the term denotes, however, is something that couldn't appear more
mundane. Either through publications or through the creation of an information desk, a shenpi-conducting agency informs prospective applicants what
application materials are required. When the application and relevant materials have been prepared, one brings them to a service window at the agency.
The employee at the window makes sure that the material is properly prepared,
conducts preliminary checks, and, if further review is required, informs the
applicant as to the time when review will be completed. The application is
then sent to various divisions within the licensing agency to process. Many
Chinese citizens have become familiar with the operation of analogous procedures from commercial transactions (ie when opening an account at a bank
or a telephone or utilities company). However, "window service" was created
for purposes of government licensing in Shenzhen only as recently as 1996.
In fact, at first the service was unique to the State Land Bureau." Consolidating the procedure was still on the agenda of that bureau even as of 2001.2
Why should a government agency's offering of "window service" be such a
celebrated event? In part, this question can be answered by conjuring up an
image of what licensing agencies had been like until very recently.7 Folklore
had it that at government offices it was "hard to get in the door, hard to find
a friendly face in the office, hard to hear a friendly word, and hardest to get
business done." Employees at the offices would claim not to be responsible for
taking applications. Even when an application was accepted, it could take an
indefinite amount of time to process, usually as a result of poor management.
Under such circumstances, it fell onto the applicants themselves to try to
move the bureaucratic process along through informal contact with line staff
or managers. Greasing the bureaucratic wheels could simply be a matter of
getting the agency staff's attention. Other times it took the form of petty
70 See Suggestions Concerning the Implementation of the AdministrativeShenpi Reform (n 23 above), s 1.3;
Several Problems in the Implementation of the Five Principles of Shenpi Reform (n 23 above), s 2.3.2;
"Implementation Plan" (n 17 above), s 2.2; "Stimulate Growth" (n 40 above), s 3.3.2; Teleconference Report Text (n 16 above); "City Cuts 277 Shenpi Items" (n 64 above).
71 The bureau's practice also managed to attract national attention: officials from all over China visited
Shenzhen in order to learn from it. See "Small Window, Huge Service" [in Chinese] on the State
Land Bureau's official website, available at http://www.szfdc.gov.cnfrealestate/guotujg/jianjie/
introduction.htm. The article offers a helpful analysis, from the perspective of bureaucratic
management, of how the "window service" system was created.
72 State Land Bureau Pledge to the Public (issued for purposes of the "acceleration" campaign), document on file with the author. Eight other municipal bureaus in Shenzhen now provide "window
service" in licensing.
7 "Small Window, Huge Service" (n 71 above).
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bribery.74 In stark contrast with this image of bureaucracy, "window service"
proposes that the bureaucratic machinery will run by itself - "automatically"
- without the need for a constant push from applicants. What would it take to
make this to happen? While official discourse in China tends to suggest that
a cultural shift in the government is what is needed," such exhortations are
less than inaccurate in identifying what the crucial difficulties for reform are.
Consider the situation of a middle-level manager - say, a division director
(chuzhang) in a municipal bureau - who faces the task of creating "window
service" at the bureau. How feasible is it to for him to integrate his division
into this system? The answer seems to depend on whether a host of conditions like the following can be satisfied. To begin with, the manager must be
able to determine the scope of his division's authority and the criteria for a
successful application. He needs to know these things not primarily in order
to notify the public concerning them, but simply to issue clear instructions to
his own employees and prevent ambiguities from stalling office operations.
Moreover, since "window service" is set up usually only when the shenpi requirements are sufficiently complex and when the number of clients is
sufficiently large, it is likely that other divisions in the bureau (not to mention offices in other bureaus) will be involved in the approval process. The
division director will need to know how his division fits into the overall scheme,
and that he can expect other divisions to do their part and respect his.
Furthermore, the division must be adequately staffed to carry out the new
tasks. 6 Otherwise, the division director could easily find himself with just
enough staff to review the applications, but none to put at the windows. And
finally, the division director needs to train and motivate his subordinates to
adapt to the new procedures, and sometimes to secure more adequate
equipment. Training, equipment, and putting in place proper incentive
schemes all require resources that may be hard to come by.
No matter how much "service consciousness" a manager has absorbed from
official exhortations, he still cannot put his ideas to work unless he can solve
these basic organisational problems, which cannot be taken for granted.n
When Shenzhen tried to implement "window service" in a larger number of

7 Over time this simply became the way things were done: operators and managers received fewer and
fewer rewards from within the bureaucracy for doing things promptly, and became motivated more
and more by extraneous incentives such as personal contact and material gain through bribery. Even
routine tasks began to take longer to process.
75 It has often been said that civil servants need to realise that their job is to "provide service to society"
and that they need to "put customers first"
76 Staffing is determined by the municipal Personnel Bureau and Staffing Office every few years or so,
without regard to the innovative administrative procedures that bureaus may be asked to adopt.
7 Indeed, some of these problems are hard to solve in government bureaucracies anywhere, See James
Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy:What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books,
1989), Ch 7 ("Constraints"), pp 113-137.
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agencies, complaints from managers about personnel" and incentive" issues
were immediately heard. It is not clear how shenpi reform itself (or the "acceleration" campaign) intended to help the bureaus address these difficulties,
most of which can be thought of as issues of government capacity. What is
clear is that the bureaus that succeeded in implementing "window service"
are those that have had the resources to invest in capacity improvement.
The State Land Bureau is the best example. In 1994, over two years before
it opened "window service", the bureau compiled a "Management and Operation Manual" for its vast operations, outlining the basic approaches of its
urban planning, design, construction, land use, and property title registration
operations. 0 Dubbed the "Basic Law" of the bureau, the manual is revised
from time to time, providing relatively specific instructions for bureau
employees, including procedures, time limits, and criteria to be used in processing different applications. 8' Also well before the implementation of
"window service", the State Land Bureau created an elaborate scheme that
ensured intra-bureau coordination. In 1995, the bureau adopted "Temporary
Provisions on the Supervision of the Processing of Documents", 82 a set of
meticulous prescriptions for how multi-division tasks would be handled that
left nothing to chance. For instance, at the beginning of each such task, a
functionally defined "document reception department" would analyze the task
into sub-tasks to be assigned to various "processing departments". Time limits
on the processing of the task and subtasks would also be fixed in advance.
Once a task reached the "processing departments", a functionally defined
''supervision department" would make sure that the time limits were observed.
A division requiring an extension would formally petition the bureau chief's
office and notify the "supervision department" that such a petition had been
filed. The "supervision department" would then continue to monitor extended
deadlines, and so on.
78 Shortages of staff reportedly gave rise to the following phenomena: (a) "operation" divisions had to
contribute staff to provide "window service"; (b) "window service" was relegated to subordinate trade
associations; (c) a large number of temporary workers were hired to provide office help; or (d) being
unable to reconcile the greater personnel needs that "window-service" created with the tight limit on
the size of each agency, some bureaus began to count their staff as "non-government" (shiye bianzhi)),
All this led to concerns that the provision of "window service ... will be short-lived." "Room for
Improvement in 'Acceleration' Campaign" (n 32 above).
79 It was reported that because so much attention was suddenly given to "window service", employees
stationed at the "windows" were subject to stricter control and heavier tasks. This led to discontent
because the "internal" work at the agencies was changing at a much slower pace. [bid.
80 "Shenzhen guihua guotu fangdichan guanli caozuo guicheng". An internal notice accompanying the issue
of the Manual is available through the Bureau's regulations database, though not the Manual itself.
The notice stated the objectives for the publication of the Manual in language that echoed many of
the proposals for the shenpi reform in Shenzhen in 2001.
81 The State Land Bureau has been able to publish the application requirements, approval criteria, and
operation flow charts for many types of licenses, available at http://www.szfdc.gov.cn/realestate/guotujgf
chkshbw/window.htm.
82 "Shenzhenshi guhua guotuju gongwen duban gongzuo zanxing guiding", available at http://www.
szfdc.gov.cn/realestate/guotujg/chkshbw/guiding/guid6.htm.
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As if this were not enough, the creation of "window service" itself in 1996
was preceded by a third manual, laying out further operation protocols."3 Of
course, the size of the Shenzhen State Land Bureau and the complexity of its
tasks may partly explain the length it has gone to define its internal procedures.
Still, the bureau's example serves to illustrate that "window service" cannot
be created in an ad hoc fashion if it is to be successful.
Nor might the provision of such service be cheap. It will help to know
that the State Land Bureau has invested over 30 million Yuan into setting
up an information system. A large data bank is maintained for the bureau;
offices are furnished with computers and intranet connections; more and
more applications are processed electronically." These technologies reduce opportunities for error and manipulation of data, and, just as
significantly, the burdens of operation for employees. They bring many of
the goods shenpi reformers strive for. The question, though, is whether all
government agencies can afford them, or, indeed, whether they should be
made able to afford them.
Other Innovations
Another set of techniques Shenzhen used to shrink the scope of shenpi was to
produce more integration among the bureaus with respect to certain tasks. In
a way, this merely involved taking the organisational tactics of the State Land
Bureau to the next level. Instead of inter-division, intra-bureau coordination,
inter-bureau, intra-government coordination was put in place. For private
undertakings that require approval from multiple agencies, this meant essentially three things. First, when approval from one agency is not dependent on
approval from another agency, the different agencies are now asked to engage
in their shenpi work simultaneously (chuanlian) instead of sequentially
(binglian). This is sometimes facilitated by creating "one-stop" government
service centres. The Foreign Investment Service Center, for example, hosts
consulting and application desks from 26 government agencies. Secondly,
when the exercise of shenpi authority by one agency depends on the result of
shenpi from another, equivalents of the "window service" system are sometimes implemented. This goes beyond "one-stop" service:"5 the various bureaus
are required to coordinate and agree on a division of labour, so as to make
"joint shenpi" (lianhe shenpi) procedures available to applicants. Under such
83 The manual was drawn up on the basis of the collective efforts of different divisions and branch
offices within the Bureau. The manual required strict compliance: no employee could modify it with.

out submitting proposals for change beforehand. An internal notice published along with the Manual
is available at http://www.szfdc.gov.cn/realestate/guotujg/chkshbw/guiding/guid4.htm.
84 "Attendees at Conference on State Land Resource Information Systems Speak Highly of Shenzhen's
System" [in Chinese], Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 5 Nov 2001.
85 "One-stop service" can be conceived as encompassed by "window service". At the individual bureau
level, for example, one can accomplish multiple transactions with an individual bureau at one time if
that bureau offers "window service"
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procedures, applicants submit material all at once, pay a single fee, and obtain the necessary approvals from a single application." Third and finally,
sometimes analogues to the "document processing supervision department"
in the State Land Bureau are created to make sure that multi-bureau work
proceeds as previously agreed. Usually, the "supervising department" is one
of several "government nannies" (zhengfu baomu) 7 that are designated to
protect the interest of select applicant groups. For example, the staff of the
Foreign Investment Service Center help certain foreign investors navigate
through bureau paperwork. Similarly, the "Office of Important Projects" in
the Planning Bureau ensures that "important projects" are not allowed to
falter in the face of bureaucratic obstacles.
Aside from the above administrative innovations, a final piece of
Shenzhen's shenpi reform was a push to standardise shenpi procedures. Bureaus
were instructed to define clear operating procedures for processing shenpi, set
precise time limits, and make information about the procedures publicly
available. Both interested parties and the general public were invited to monitor the bureaus' implementation and observance of these procedures."
The emphasis on accountability was mirrored by a highly unusual feature
of the "acceleration" campaign, which was that the Shenzhen government
infused into the campaign a significant element of public participation. In
September 2001, the Bureau of Administrative Supervision began an extensive review of the "acceleration" campaign, and invited journalists to publish
its findings." As a result, criticisms of bureau practices from a variety of angles
were aired. Moreover, in a rare - probably unprecedented - move in November,
the Political Consultative Conference of Shenzhen was invited to join the

86 Within the organisational structure, this is usually achieved when one bureau was designated to be
the "lead agency" in the joint shenpi work and is responsible for drafting proposals - which would be
analogues of the State Land Bureau manuals - for the management of the multi-bureau shenpi. A
consensus on such proposals would then be hammered out among the participating agencies, which
were required to send mid- or high-level managers to take part in this process, and to give their
delegates suitable decision-making powers. "Implementation Plan" (n 17 above), s 2.2. One would
imagine that inter-bureau coordination would be harder to achieve than coordination within a bureau.
News reports occasionally supported this conjecture but provided no details.
87 "Shenzhen Provides Thorough 'Nanny Service' to Foreign Investors" [in Chinese], People's Daily
(Overseas Edition), 8 Mar 2001.
88 See, for example, "Stimulate Growth" (n 32 above), s 3.3.1 This kind of piecemeal reform of administrative procedures is not unprecedented in China: the enactment of the Administrative Penalty
Law in 1996 had already led to similar standardisation in a different area. In Shenzhen, the implementation of the Administrative Penalty Law has developed into a novel institutional arrangement
of "integrated administrative law enforcement", whereby agencies delegate their authority for imposing administrative penalties to a unified law enforcement force. See, for example, "Head of Office of
'City Management According to Law' interviewed" [in Chinese], Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 7 Jan 2002.
Even such piecemeal reforms are nonetheless welcome, of course, as they clearly improve the protection of citizens' rights.
8 See articles cited (n 69 above). See also, "View of 'Acceleration' at Agencies Offering 'Window Service' [in Chinese] (undated, posted at Shenzhen Government On-line http://www.sz.govemment.
cn on 28 Aug 2001), Shenzhen SEZ Daily; "Room for Improvement in 'Acceleration' Campaign"
(n 32 above).
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Bureau of Administrative Supervision in a systematic review of the performance of 18 government agencies in connection with the "acceleration"
campaign. The evaluation that this joint review finally delivered was apparently both detailed and varied. 0 The Shenzhen government thus seemed
genuinely interested in proving its worth to groups of flesh-and-blood investors.
"Enhancing the investment environment" was not merely an abstract slogan.
It is clear, however, that these forms of accountability come too late in the
policymaking process to affect the substance of regulations. In no part of the
shenpi reform in 2001 did Shenzhen's government leaders try to solicit public
input as to how shenpi could be reduced or replaced by alternative regulatory
instruments. No one outside the government was asked to assess the reform's
success or failure. Instead, the city government itself decided that reduction
in application processing time, implementation of "window services", and
the satisfaction of a quota (ie a 30 per cent reduction in shenpi procedures)
richly imbued with ambiguity were proper measures of success, and thereupon declared victory.
Shenzhen's government leaders thus not only dodged, but also behaved as
if in denial of, a major challenge for shenpi reform, which is that a frequent
cause of defective policies in China is the very insularity of the policymaking
process. It is unlikely that these leaders were unaware of the challenge: after
all, the disappointments that came from asking government agencies to reform themselves were felt daily. It is more likely that no strategy of coping
with this challenge had sufficient political support in 2001. The nature of
this challenge is now examined more closely.

Holding Agencies Accountable in Policy Implementation
Critics of regulatory policies in China differ in their views as to what are the
common policy pitfalls as well as their respective causes. The charge that the
government over-regulates is often heard, though this is not surprising in light
of China's recent past of central planning." It is also received wisdom that a
main cause of persistent over-regulation is that government agencies form
centres of vested interests, which prevent the delegation or devolution of
decision-making to new agencies or non-government actors.92 A more novel
90 "'Acceleration' Shows Results" (n 69 above).
91 See, for example, Qian Yingyi, "Market and the Rule of Law" [in Chinese], in Li Jiange (ed), At the
Frontier of Market Reform (Shanghai: Yuandong Publishing, 2001) (festschrift in honor of Wu Jinglian),
pp 31-56; Wu Jinglian, "General Goals of Government Reform Under New Circumstances" [in
Chinese], in Wu, Reform: Now at a Critical Point (Beijing: Sanlian Publishing, 2001), p 61.
92 Talk of "vested interest" has of course long been an entrenched feature of critical discourse within the
Chinese Communist Party, and not at all proprietary to government critics. Cf texts (n 17 and 36
above).
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line of critique highlights the fact that the government is prone to policy
reversals, the frequency and magnitude of which often cannot be justified by
actual economic or social changes. That is, policy reversals form an independent source of risk for economic actors apart from other risks inherent in
economic undertakings, and often dominate these other risks in deterring
business investment.93 The propensity for policy reversals may be evidence
that, even when the government is acting in good faith, it tends to cycle
through ineffective policies; it is the choice of wrong policy instruments, not
a uniform pattern of over-regulation, that more accurately characterizes typical policy failures" This in turn suggests that it is not enough to postulate
rent-seeking motives on the part of bureaucrats to explain bad policy. Other
causes may also be at work. In other empirical contexts, for example, political
scientists have observed that government agencies, like most organisations,
do not adapt easily to radical changes in their tasks." In light of this general
thesis, we can expect that when Chinese agencies originally created, structured,
and staffed according to policies suitable only to the planned economy are
asked to design policies that sustain market institutions, they tend to propose
changes that fall far short of what is called for. Thus it may be institutional
ossification, rather than the rent-seeking behaviour of bureaucrats, that better explains defective policy design in China.
Either explanation works, however, only because of the additional fact
that government agencies hold monopolies over policymaking processes in
China. To some extent, such monopolies result from the resemblance that
the Chinese administrative state bears to the executive branch in a parliamentary system. It is widely held that in parliamentary polities, the executive
branch dominates the policymaking process. It not only implements policies
but is also in control of their design." Moreover, aside from multiparty
elections, the executive branch is under weak supervision from legislatures,
The thesis was put forward by Zhang Weiying. See Zhang Weiying, "The Reputational Basis of Market Order" [in Chinese], in Zhang, Property Rights, Government and Reputation (Beijing: Sanlian
Publishing, 2001), pp 1-20, and generally, the essays collected in that volume. The Chinese
government's decision in the fall of 2001 to release a significant amount of state-owned shares of
former state-owned enterprises into the stock market, followed by the prompt reversal of that decision,
served as an all-too-perfect illustration of Zhang's thesis.
9 The following fable by Zhang Weiying illustrates the dynamics of such policy cycles. Trees are planted
in a village commune but go unattended and grow poorly, because of the incentive structure created
by state ownership. In response, village leaders decide to assign ownership of the trees to villagers.
Some villagers, however, fearing that ownership will be taken back from them, immediately cut
down the trees to use for timber. And sure enough, alarmed by the number of trees being cut down,
the village leaders reclaim the trees, leaving those who did not misuse their ownership rights to regret
their inaction, Ibid., p 11.
95 Cf Wilson (n 77 above), Ch 10 ("Turf"), pp 179-195, and Ch 12 ("Innovation"), pp 218-234, and
the references therein.
96 For instance, it is often the ministries and not the parliament that draft legislation. For parliamentary
systems in general, see ibid., Ch 16 ("National Differences"), pp 295-314. See also Susan RoseAckerman, Controlling Environment Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), Ch 4, for a
discussion of regulatory policymaking in Germany.
9

446 Wei Cui

(2003) HKLJ

interest groups, or the judiciary in its policymaking activities." These basic
patterns hold in China as well, though they are overshadowed by the Communist Party's rejection of political change through democratic elections.
Taking all of this into account, we can say that the policymaking process in
China is uniquely insulated from outside input, allowing the character of government agencies to directly determine the process' outcome.
In light of this extremely undemocratic process, advocates for reform have
seen public participation in legislation or rule-making as the most urgent
corrective.98 Yet it is important not to be captive to extreme oppositions.
While public input at the legislative or rule-making stage may uniquely
emblematise democracy, one should recall that in any kind of polity, when
the government pursues new and untried policy goals, actual policy strategies
can only emerge during implementation, and legislation lies only at the beginning of a policy evolution process. Significant policy discretion thus lies
with the implementing agencies, and a variety of mechanisms for holding
agencies accountable offer further opportunities for the public to shape policies.
These include legislative supervision, judicial review of rule-making, feedback mechanisms internal to the executive branch's hierarchy, and, in the
case of the implementation of a national policy, the intervention of local
governments. Improvement in any of these mechanisms in China could help
generate more robust input into the policymaking process. It is only when
none of these mechanisms is allowed to properly function that policymaking
is completely held hostage to bureaucrats.
Neither during Shenzhen's shenpi reform in 2001, nor during the drafting
process at the national level of the Administrative Licensing Law, was there
any sign that Chinese political leaders were interested in strengthening the
roles of legislative and judicial institutions in shaping regulatory policy.99
None of the drafts of the Administrative Licensing Law (including drafts
produced by the National People's Congress in 1998)'00 attempted to introduce greater legislative or judicial supervision, nor did any of the documents

Wilson (n 74 above), Ch 16.
9 Cf the discussion of the introduction of public hearings to legislative and rule-making contexts in
section four, in accompanying text (nn 147-149 below). See also references (n 144 helow). Some
Chinese legal scholars seem especially impressed by the judicially enforceable "notice and comment"
procedures employed by US federal agencies. See Rose-Ackerman (n 96 above), for the uniqueness of
this American institution, and Jerry Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), Ch 7, for an analysis. It should be further noted that the effectiveness of both
legislative and rule-making hearings may depend on the participation of organised interest groups;
thus the current restriction on interest group formation in China is another factor that cautions
against relying on public participation at the legislative stage for broadening the policymaking process.
9 It is known that, during 2001, some members of the People's Congress Standing Committee (PCSC)
took part in shenpi reform in Shanghai. Conversation with a member of the Shanghai PCSC, Oct
2001. However, this appears to have been the exception, and it is unclear to what extent the Shanghai PCSC will remain involved in regulatory policymaking in the future.
10 On file with the author.
9
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produced by the Shenzhen government in connection with shenpi reform.
Since shenpi reform was initiated and led by the executive branch, this was
not altogether unexpected. What was perhaps more surprising was how other
opportunities for strengthening accountability in policymaking was passed
up. For example, it was observed in the first section of this article that, had
Shenzhen's Shenpi Reform Staff Office chosen to review the rationality and
not just the legality of the shenpi policies of Shenzhen's specialised bureaus, it
would have grasped an opportunity to translate novel but abstract principles
of institutional design into concrete measures. We could interpret this opportunity in terms of either of two mechanisms just named: in some cases the
Shenpi Reform Staff Office's opposition to bureau policies would have been
an act of local intervention in the implementation of a national policy; in
other cases it could have been an exercise of internal monitoring. But precisely because the Shenpi Reform Staff Office did not seize this opportunity,
and instead acted as mere enforcers of laws of higher authority, the bureaus
remained the sole provider of empirical input into regulatory reform.
If we assume that the failure to impose greater accountability within the
executive branch was not due simply to a lack of will, closer examination is
required as to its cause. There is evidence that both defective strategies and
defective institutions were culpable.

Strategies of Accountability
If strategies could be devised to ensure that the bureaus standardised their
shenpi procedures, why couldn't the same strategies be used to force them to
adopt genuine policy changes in accordance with new regulatory principles?
The answer is that the conception of government accountability implicit in
Shenzhen's promotion of the standardisation of shenpi procedures rested
squarely on the assumption that the bureaus themselves would have developed,
in advance, clearly prescribed rules about what improved administrative procedures would consist of. Accountability was then merely a matter of
monitoring compliance with these rules. Procedural rules could be designed,
for example, for the reception and processing of license applications (eg regarding documentation, timing, criteria, and so on), or for the imposition of
administrative penalties when license terms are violated. Once these rules
were made publicly known, even non-governmental parties - license
applicants, licensees, and so on - could monitor agency compliance with them.
In more serious cases of non-compliance, the aggrieved parties could file for
administrative reconsideration or even initiate administrative litigation.
Officials responsible for implementing shenpi reform were less interested
in using the public remedial system to discipline agencies than they were in
creating some form of internal monitoring to ensure accountability. The
newest embodiment of internal monitoring has been a system for "holding
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administrative agency personnel responsible for misconduct" (xingzheng
jiguan gongzuo renyuan guocuo zeren zhuijiu). The system was designed by the
Bureau of Administrative Supervision, and was codified in provisional
rules issued by the city government.101 The rules state - for seven kinds of
actions agency personnel might perform' - detailed definitions of categories of official misconduct, mechanisms for detection and imposition of
sanctions, and the type of sanction appropriate for each category of
misconduct."' Shenzhen's officials have been so interested in instituting
this system of administrative discipline, in fact, that they made explicit
reference to it in the general regulation on shenpi.,'
How, though, is the kind of internal monitoring embodied in the "agency
personnel responsibility" system to deal with situations where no clear-cut
rules can be prescribed in advance for agency actions?o One would expect
such situations to be the predominant kind when agencies are asked to pursue new substantive policies, as opposed to simply standardising existing
practice. To see this, we do not have to consider the most ambitious principles advocated in shenpi reform, for example the idea of replacing
government regulation with market mechanisms or private self-regulation.
Certain more basic reform goals, without any deregulatory thrust, suffice to
illustrate the point.
101 "Notice Concerning the Publication of 'Provisional Rules on Holding Administrative Agency
Personnel Responsible for Misconduct" (18 Dec 2001), Shenzhen City Government Notice (2001)
No.179.
102 These actions include: administrative permission (shenpi), tax and tariff collection, inspection,
penalties, legal enforcement against property or the person, administrative reconsideration, and coordination with other agencies.
103 For shenpi procedures in general, for example, 15 categories of misconduct are listed, and six types of
sanctions matched to them. The rules are open to further refinement at the bureau level.
io4 "Regulations Regarding the System of Shenpi and Registration in Shenzhen" (Appendix Two to
this report), Art 10. Art 9 of the Regulation makes reference to another new system for constraining official discretion which is aimed more specifically at top bureau officials and which prescribes
new procedures for collective decision-making. That system is laid out in "Deliberative Rules for
Collective Decision-Making on Important Matters in Municipal-Controlled Entities" [in Chinese]
(1 Apr 2001), Office of the Shenzhen Communist Party Committee (2001) Notice No.6. The
collective decision-making system is enforced by the Party's Organization Department and the
Discipline and Inspection Commission. It is thus even further removed from administrative law
than the agency personnel responsibility system.
1os Another problem with the "agency personnel responsibility" system, thought perhaps somewhat
academic, is that it displays a misunderstanding of the nature of administrative law. Ordinarily, one
would think that the primary function of laws constraining government action is to grant public
remedies against agency misconduct - that is, remedies that are available to citizens through legal
mechanisms. Rules consisting of disciplinary measures against civil servants that are available only to
their immediate bureaucratic superiors, by contrast, seem not to belong to the legal system at all, but
to the field of government management. In their determination to achieve results in shenpi reform,
however, Shenzhen officials seem to have found this too fine a distinction. The Legislative Affairs
Office of the State Council has gone further than Shenzhen in this regard by devoting a whole
chapter (Ch 9) of the draft Administrative Licensing Law to prescribing severe-sounding disciplinary
measures to ensure compliance with the Law. For an explanation of the basic differences between
legal and administrative mechanisms, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Richard A. Merrill, Peter M. Shane,
Administrative Law: The American Public Law System, (St. Paul, Minn: West Group, 4th edn, 1998),
pp 395-403.
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Consider the goal of encouraging agencies to engage in more effective
post-shenpi regulation. When agencies have previously relied solely on shenpi
to conduct regulation, they could be expected, at least at the beginning, to
lack a clear idea of what the most effective regulatory alternatives are."'
Therefore, even for those agencies that, let us suppose, will succeed eventually in finding effective regulatory alternatives, a period of trial and error is
normal. During this period, no set of clear-cut rules can be stated to describe the agencies' tasks. In such cases, how are the agencies to be held
accountable for engaging in good-faith attempts to identify effective ways
of implementing the new policy? A zealous pursuit of the "agency personnel
responsibility" system would quite plainly be misguided. To punish agency
personnel when there are no clear rules with which they have failed to
comply seems unjust. On the other hand, occasionally circumstances (ie
industrial accidents) may strongly suggest that particular regulatory policies have been ineffective, at which point investigations may discover that
certain government officials are culpable. Yet a system of accountability
that is triggered only when disastrous consequences have emerged seems
clearly inadequate, because it under-deters the kind of conduct that allows
disasters to come to pass.
The "agency personnel responsibility" system's emphasis on compliance
monitoring, as opposed to supervision of the agencies' pursuit of broadlydefined policy objectives, is also manifest in the legal concept of responsibility it employs. Even though the system contemplates public reprimands of
agencies, it is predominantly focused on the accountability of individual
officials. Yet it is rare that a few individuals can be said to be responsible for
all of the outcomes of an agency's policy. If any mechanism of accountability
is to realise the goal of supervising policy implementation, as opposed to merely
the goal of compliance monitoring, it must employ a concept of accountability that can call the conduct of the agency as a whole into question. 1
In fact, a great virtue of some existing forms of external monitoring of
government agencies, eg as exemplified in the mechanisms of administrative
litigation, is precisely that they do recognise the power of agencies as
organisations. In administrative litigation procedures, it is always the conduct of government officials as representatives of government agencies, and
not as individuals, that is the object of challenge. Of course, when there are
no clear-cut rules with which agencies can meaningfully be forced to comply,
further complicates the obvious difficulty that what "efectiveness" means can also be vague for
the work of many agencies. Cf Wilson (n 77 above), Ch 5.
107It is possible that the emphasis on sanctions against individual officials is more in keeping with
China's political system than would be various forms of agency liability. Punishment of individuals
can be more easily kept as an "internal" matter, following "internal" procedures. By contrast, it is
more difficult to reprimand agencies in secret. Casual observation suggests that in China it is fairly
rare for agencies to be named when their policies cause problems.
C6This
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the nature of external monitoring also changes. Agency actions that aggrieved
parties might challenge typically will not be ones prohibited by agency policy,
but those that agency policy permits or even encourages. Therefore, complainants are put in the position of having to directly challenge agency policy.
It is widely known that, in China's current public remedial system, this is still
extremely difficult to do."' The irony would be great if, precisely when external monitoring is unavailable to ensure accountability, internal monitoring
in the state bureaucracy also fails. The rules under the "agency personnel
responsibility" system suggest, however, that this may just be the case.
Institutions of Internal Monitoring
As was seen in the second section of this article, two government offices in
the city's central administration, the Bureau of Administrative Supervision
and the Legislation Bureau, actively participated in shenpi reform. More
generally, both bureaus are organised to provide crucial assistance to the mayor.
Examining some of the two bureaus' organisational features - such as what
investigative powers into the operations of the specialised bureaus they possess,
and what supervision over the policymaking work of each specialised bureau
they exercise - allows one to further measure the Shenzhen government's
capacity for internal monitoring that goes beyond the simplest forms of compliance monitoring.
Take the Bureau of Administrative Supervision (BAS) first. Shenzhen's
BAS appears to be one of the most active in the country.' 09 This is in no
small part thanks to the fact that it is the only administrative supervision
department in the country operating on its own: in all other jurisdictions - at
the municipal, provincial, and even national levels - the administrative supervision system is merged with the Communist Party's Discipline and
Inspection (jilli jiancha) system. For example, besides reporting to the mayor,
the Shenzhen BAS also reports to the Administrative Supervision Department of Guangdong Province. That latter entity is part of the Guangdong
Provincial Discipline and Inspection Commission (jiiijianchaweiyuanhui, or
DIC). But within Shenzhen, not only is the BAS distinct from the DIC at the
municipal level; each has subordinate offices in the various bureaus that are
also distinct.

108The difficulty is basically threefold: (a) the judiciary has very limited power to review agency rules;

(b) government internal review mechanisms that might have been expected to ameliorate the consequence of weak judicial oversight are weak; and (c) injunctive remedies are consequently generally
unavailable. These issues will be studied in the fifth section of this article.
109See Shenzhen Bureau of Administrative Supervision, "Critical Points in Shenzhen's Supervision
Work in 2001" lin Chinese] (6 Mar 2001), Shenzhen People's Government (2001) Notice No.
35; "Profile of Administrative Supervision Work in Shenzhen" [in Chinese], Shenzhen SEZ Daily,
20 Dec 2001.
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Reflecting this independence, the Shenzhen BAS has performed a much
larger variety of tasks than one would expect from a branch of the Discipline
and Inspection system. In the 1990s, China's DICs have led a highly publicised
campaign against corruption in government, prosecuting guilty officials and
establishing systems of prevention. The Shenzhen BAS has participated in
that effort, too, but it has not been its major task. In addition, the Shenzhen
BAS has actively assisted the mayor in reform of the local taxation, housing,
social security, and government procurement systems.110 As we have seen, it
also played various roles in shenpi reform."' It is likely that in each of these
reform campaigns, the bureau's assignment was to design and implement various compliance monitoring mechanisms. However, the bureau has also shown
interest in in-depth investigation of substantive policy areas. In 2001, it had
planned to probe into the regulation of the city's construction market, markets for land-use rights and for rights in state-owned assets, as well as into
government procurement and several government infrastructure investment
projects. These investigations, if they had been pursued as planned, might
well have gone beyond procedural issues.112
However, the blessings of independence the Shenzhen BAS enjoys come
together with a curse: serious operational as well as political impediments
result from its unconventional status. The operational difficulties are as follows.
Nominally, the BAS has branches, known as administrative supervision divisions (xingzheng jianchachu), within the specialised bureaus. Yet these divisions
are mainly accountable to their respective bureau chiefs, not to the BAS. In
other words, there is no direct hierarchical command from the BAS to the
administrative supervision divisions. In telling contrast - suggesting that this
kind of hierarchical command is important - each specialised bureau also has
a Discipline and Inspection office, and this office always reports directly to
the municipal DIC and not to the chief of the bureau in which it sits. It has
been observed that this arrangement strengthens the Discipline and Inspection system's investigative capacity."' Conversely, therefore, one could predict
that the lack of hierarchical integration weakens the BAS' fact-finding powers.
This prediction is confirmed by the complaint voiced by the bureau during
shenpi reform that it received poor quality information from the specialised
bureaus."' The subordinate administrative supervision divisions did not seem
to facilitate access to information.
110 Ibid.
111It participated in the review of bureau shenpi policies, organised public review of agency performance
in the "acceleration" campaign, and designed compliance monitoring mechanisms in standardising
shenpi procedures.
112 The Administrative Supervision Law grants a broad mandate to "administrative supervision organs"
to conduct this kind of investigation. See, for example, Art 18, para 1; Art 23, paras 1- 2; Art 29; Art
42; Art 44, para 5.
113 Personal interview with a DIC official, Shenzhen, Sept 2001.
114See accompanying text (n 32 above).
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The political conundrum for the BAS is equally severe. The Discipline
and Inspection system achieved prominent status in the Chinese political
system in the 1990s due to the government's overwhelming need to combat
corruption. In Shenzhen, for example, the head of the DIC participates in
the meetings of the Standing Committee of the city government, and thus
has equal standing with the deputy mayors of the city."' The chief of the
BAS, by contrast, ranks only with other municipal bureau chiefs - and even
there his ranking is not high. It is thus questionable whether the mayor is a
reliable ally of the BAS. Moreover, by design the BAS has no turf: there is no
particular sphere of social or economic activity that it directly or exclusively
governs. Therefore it has no constituency outside the government either. "'
American scholars of public administration have argued that the key strategy for a government agency's success is finding a constituency." The
predicament of Shenzhen's BAS suggests that this thesis may well apply in
China as well. One example comes from the State Land Bureau. It was explained earlier that the State Land Bureau had created an intricate scheme of
intra-bureau coordination called the "document supervision system". A functionally defined "supervision department" was in charge of ensuring the
system's smooth operation. In reality, it is the administrative supervision division in the State Land Bureau that plays this role. The trouble is that
document supervision is a completely managerial task: not only are the operations overseen are entirely routine, in the State Land Bureau the supervising
department is also expected to performing the managerial function of recommending awards to employees as well as sanctions for different levels of
performance."I Clearly, within the State Land Bureau, the bureau's own priorities have superseded those of the BAS.
The BAS's operational and political difficulties are closely paralleled by
those of the municipal Legislation Bureau. The Legislation Bureau has four
substantive divisions."' The two largest divisions - the "economic regulation

115 See accompanying text (nn 25-26 above).
116 In the US federal government, the Offices of the Inspector General - to whose functions the administrative supervision sytcin bears some resemblance - have constituencies in the Congress. See Paul
C. Light, Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the Search for Acountability (Washington
DC: the Brookings Institution, 1993). This is of course even truer of the General Accounting Office

serving the US Congress.

117Wilson (n 77 above), Ch 11, pp 202-205. Wilson quotes Norton Long: "There is no more forlorn
spectacle in the administrative world than an agency and a program posessed of statutory life, armed
with executive orders, sustained in the courts, yet stricken with paralysis and deprived of power, an
object of contempt to its enemies and of despair to its friends. The lifeblood of administration is
power." Wilson goes on to say: "The principal source of power is a constituency." Mhid., p 204.
118 See "Temporary Provisions on the Supervision of the Processing of Documents" (n 82 above).
119 The "administrative reconsideration division" serves as a tribunal for disputes brought against government agencies pursuant to the Administrative Reconsideration Law. The "administrative
implementation of law division" supervises the establishment of legal compliance mechanisms throughout the city bureaucracy. A research arm - the Legal Research Institute - operates as an auxiliary
institution (shiye danwei) of the Bureau.
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division" and "administrative regulation division" - review proposed government regulations, as well as draft local statutes to be submitted to the local
legislature for review. It is the operation of these two divisions that bears directly on the policymaking process. In the case of government regulations,
much of the time the drafting is done by the legal divisions (faguichu) of
specialised bureaus that seek to institute new policies. In theory, the Legislation Bureau has some supervisory authority over these lower legal divisions. In
reality, the bureau exercises no supervision over agency policymaking at all.
The lower legal divisions report to their respective bureaus, whereas the Legislation Bureau reports to the mayor. They have entirely distinct loyalties. During
shenpi reform, the Legislation Bureau had to rely on the mayor to order the
specialised bureaus to submit documents stating the legal basis of their shenpi
policies. It was not able to request these documents directly from the bureaus'
respective legal divisions. This precisely echoes the operational difficulties that
the BAS encountered during shenpi reform.
Because Legislation Bureau does not directly or exclusively regulate any
sphere of social or economic activity, it should come as no surprise that it is
also a constituency-less agency. Casual inquiry suggested that the average
citizen in Shenthen might not even know that the Legislation Bureau existed.
Some local government observers claim - in all probability truthfully - that

the specialised bureaus are much more likely to have the ear of the mayor
than is the Legislation Bureau.I2" One even hears the remark that the Legislation Bureau is merely a "secretary" for the mayor: it does the legal paperwork, and converts its boss' dictated wishes into legal language. At least this
last piece of disparagement is unfair. Unlike the Administrative Office of
the Municipal Government (shihengfi bangongzing), the Legislation Bureau's
"secretarial" skills consists, after all, in the highly professional legal skills of
its staff members. Without the Legislation Bureau's expertise in the drafting
of law and its even more important command of whole bodies of local and
national law, much of the citv's regulations would not have existed. Especially in cases where a specific regulation is contemplated but the relevant
specialised bureau is either unable or unwilling to take initiative in the
drafting, the Legislation Bureau must be prepared to undertake major legislative research projects. Thus, to Legislation Bureau staff members, a key
problem of their institution may often seem to be the lack of specialisation,
which alone would allow achieving policy visions that are of any depth. (No
secretarial office would even aspire to such achievements. One Legislation
Bureau official observed that Shenchen would be able to produce higherquality regulations, as well as a greater number of them, if the legal divisions

a

One senior ,Aicial in the Legisltion Bureau confirmed that access to the Marer israre. Personal
interview, Shethen, July ANIP
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of the various bureaus were absorbed up into the Legislation Bureau, which
would greatly enhance the bureau's policymaking capacity."'
Nonetheless, the Legislation Bureau's professionalism by itself will not secure it a constituency nor endow it with fact-finding powers. Thus the
Legislation Bureau shares the BAS' weaknesses as an internal monitoring
institution. These weaknesses, one might say, merely went on full display during Shenzhen's shenpi reform in 2001. They call into question whether even a
local government's chief executive can monitor agency performance confidently.
The tenuousness of these mechanisms of internal monitoring implies that
the fate of new policies is likely to fall entirely into the hands of lower agencies not subject to any further accountability. As our survey of recent legal
developments in Shenzhen in the next section will show, Shenzhen lawmakers are not unaware that agency rule-making needs to be monitored, and that
the channels for participation in policymaking need to be broadened. But
they did not adopt these measures as strategies of shenpi reform. For example,
there was no evidence that the "Normative Document Rules," discussed below in the next section, engaged Shenzhen leaders' attention in anything like
the way shenpi reduction, the "acceleration" campaign, or the "restructuring"
campaign did. This was possibly because government leaders did not think
that the process of policymaking could have a direct impact on the substance
and style of government agencies' regulatory activities. Alternatively, even if
they were aware of how much the policymaking process can shape or distort
policy outcome, the idea of opening that process to greater input may have
seemed achievable only in the long term, and not something that can be relied on to produce immediate results. If anything, opening up the policymaking
process might have seemed to belong to a category of incremental - as opposed to "radical" - reform measures. The irony of this calculation, of course,
is that Shenzhen may have thus passed up the opportunity to initiate the only
kind of reform that could really make a difference.

Incremental Improvements to the Policymaking Process
In the previous three sections we have concerned ourselves mainly with
Shenzhen government activities in 2001. A few recent legislations in the
city, though not officially part of shenpi reform, also promise to have a positive influence on the making of regulatory policies. To leave this aspect of
Shenzhen's legal reform out of the picture would be to have our view blinkered
by what officials have chosen to label as "shenpi reform". An examination of
121 Personal interview, Shenzhen, July 2001. However, the official pointed out that this idea had little

chance of being realised in the near term.
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the content of the new laws will yield clues as to what kind of, and to what
extent, reform of the policymaking process is presently feasible.
Imposing Order in the Sphere of Normative Documents
In September 2000, Shenzhen adopted "Rules Regarding the Management of
the Normative Documents of Administrative Agencies" (the "Normative
Document Rules"), which took effect on 1 January 200 1.122 This local regulation governs all normative documents issued by the Municipal Government,
the municipal agencies, and Shenzhen's district governments that are intended
to be effective for more than six months. Even before the onset of the shenpi
reform campaign, the Normative Document Rules announced that
establishing, modifying, or repealing shenpi procedures through normative
documents issued by municipal agencies and district governments would
henceforth be prohibited.123 By implication, only the Municipal Government
itself and the People's Congress and its Standing Committee could create or
modify shenpi requirements in Shenzhen. The effect of the Normative Document Rules on the making of regulatory policies in the city in general, of
course, goes well beyond this single provision. This is because normative documents are the primary way in which Chinese government agencies express
their intentions regarding the manner in which policies will be implemented.
Moreover, under current administrative law, the promulgation of normative
documents is a type of government decision of general applicability (an
"abstract administrative act") and therefore not reviewable in court. The
extensive requirements that the Normative Document Rules impose thus
promise finally to bring order to this chaotic sphere of government activity.
The Rules impose two major systems of requirements on agency documents.
The first is a set of mandatory publication requirements that must be satisfied
before the documents take effect. The second is a quality-check system: even
though municipal agencies will often have authority to enact normative documents without involvement of the Municipal Government, they are now
required to submit these documents to the Legislation Bureau for review before publication."'
Shenzhen's centralised system for publishing municipal law, including normative documents, has become a highly effective one. At the core of this system
is the Shenzhen People's Government Bulletin. A whole separate regulation is

122 Shenzhen Legislation Bureau, Collection of New Statutes and Regulations of the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone 2000 (Shenzhen: Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2001), pp 154-164.
123 Normative Document Rules, Art 7, para 1.
124 While city bureaus had been required to file normative documents with the Legislation Bureau before,
they were required to do so only after the documents had been published and become effective. The
level of compliance was correspondingly low. Personal interview, Shenzhen, July 2001
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devoted to prescribing its operation and distribution.' All actions by municipal agencies to adopt, change or revoke normative documents must be published
in the municipal Government Bulletin to have legal effect, and they must be
published in that bulletin before being published elsewhere.' 26 All announcements of agency rules that violate these requirements, once detected, are declared
void. Given these clear-cut stipulations, non-publication of normative documents is likely to decline rapidly."
The second system of requirements call for municipal agencies to submit
normative documents to the Legislation Bureau' 28 for "legal and technical
review" 25 days before the intended effective date of the documents."' In
addition to standard forms and the texts of the normative documents
themselves, the agencies must submit texts of the "Laws, statutes, regulations,
national policies or order or decision of superior administrative agencies" on
which the normative documents are based, as well as "other relevant material" on which the documents rely. Moreover, if the provisions of a document
relate to the administrative spheres of other agencies, "explanations of the
results of consultations" with such agencies are required.' 30
Once possessed of such material, the Legislation Bureau is to conduct
review according the two sets of criteria. The first set of criteria state certain
broad norms that each agency should aim to satisfy in its adoption of a normative document. The document (1) must be "necessary for performing the
agency's legally prescribed duties;" (2) it must have been "clearly authorised"
by higher law or by superior agencies; (3) the content of the document must
be "in accord" with laws and national policies; (4) it must not merely repeat

125 "Rules on the Management of the Shenzhen People's Government Bulletin", Shenzhen Legislation

Bureau, Collection of New Statutes and Regulations of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 2000 (Shenzhen:
Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2001), pp 165-169.
126 The Normative Document Rules, Arts 8, 29 and 30. District government documents are to be published in government bulletins in the respective districts; they do not need to be reviewed by the
Legislation Bureau before publication, but only need to be entered into record with the latter.
127 Shenzhen's example was not atypical of Chinese local governments' efforts during 2001 to achieve
compliance with the WTO requirement that "Illaws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made effective by any contracting party ... be published promptly
in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them." General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, Art 10, para 1. One might say that this type of compliance with the
WTO's requirement of transparency is already, or at least will soon become, a non-issue in places like
Shenzhen. One Legislation Bureau official confirmed that Shenzhen's lawmakers' interest in this
area has already moved on to the creation of channels of public informational access to government
decisions in individual cases. Personal interview, July 2001. In 2002, Shenzhen has adopted legislation to expand the range of government documents that are treated as public records. How much of
this is capable of revealing agency operations is yet unclear. "Citizens Can Now Inspect Govemment
Documents" [in Chinese], Jing Bao, 13 June 2002; "City Adopts Rules Governing the Use and Col.
lection of Records and Documents" [in Chinese], Shenzhen SEZ Daily, 10 June 2002.
128 The regulation speaks throughout not of the Legislation Bureau but of the "municipal government's
legal department" This institution-neutral phrasing is standard practice and will be highlighted below in the discussion of the State Council Recording Rules. See accompanying text (n 194 below).
129 Normative Document Rules, Art 17.
130 Ibid., Art 19. Submission for review is mandatory just like the publication requirement. Art 30.
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the content of other laws, policies, and orders or decisions of superior agencies;
(5) the document should not conflict with the powers of other agencies; and
(6) it must satisfy certain stylistic requirements."' The second set of criteria
is proscriptive, forbidding bureaus from engaging in activities that only
higher-level government entities are authorised to pursue." 2
The authority with which the Legislation Bureau is to apply these criteria
has a subtle institutional dimension. On the one hand, it must carry out reviews conscientiously: if any normative document fails to meet any of the
above criteria, but is allowed into publication due to the Legislation Bureau's
negligence, the latter will be held accountable.' 3 On the other hand, the
bureau must perform each review task promptly, producing a "review opinion" within 10 days."' If it fails to meet this deadline, the agency proposing
the normative document can bring it directly to the Administrative Office of
the Municipal Government and request publication.'35 Moreover, if an agency
disagrees with the Legislation Bureau's opinion, it can appeal within 10 days
to the Municipal Government."' Finally, even when the Legislation Bureau
endorses a document as having satisfied relevant criteria, the Administrative
Office of the Municipal Government can still reject the document if it deems
the content of the document "inappropriate".1 7
These provisions suggest that, in conducting quality checks on normative
documents, the Legislation Bureau is on the same footing with - and does not
stand above - the specialised bureaus. The point of this characterization becomes clearer if one draws a comparison with the process of making local
regulations. In the latter process, even if a specialised bureau has proposed
and initially drafted a regulation, the regulation will eventually be promulgated in the name of the Municipal Government. The Municipal Government
is an essential participant in the process, and the Legislation Bureau its indispensable legislative assistant. There is no way of evading the Legislation Bureau

13

132

[bid., Art 6.

[bid., Art 7. Bureau and district government documents cannot be used to (a) alter the system of

shenpi requirements; (b) change matters that involve fees for the government's auxiliary (xingzheng
shiye xing) services or services that have a business character (jingyingfuwu xing); (c) alter the system
of administrative penalties and administrative compulsory measures; (d) restrict or sanction against
those rights and interests of citizens and organisations that are recognised by law; (e) establish (beyond
what isallowed by [national] Laws) systems of compulsory tests and measurements or declarations,
compulsory purchases, and measures that discriminate again non-local products or companies; or (f)
govern other matters that "ought to be governed by higher law or agencies." Cf text (n 45 above).
3 [bid., Art 41.
134 In the review opinion, the bureau can either endorse a document as satisfying all of the criteria of
Arts 6 and 7, or request modification if the criteria are not completely met, or reject a proposed
normative document if any of (1), (2), (3) and (6) are not satisfied. Ibid., Arts 21 and 22. (The Rules
do not say whether deficiency under criteria (4), (5), and, especially, under (a)-(f, can be grounds
for rejection.)
'3 Ibid., Art 27.
13 [bid., Art 24.
13 [bid., Art 26.
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and getting a local regulation adopted.' Under the Normative Document
Rules, by contrast, ways of sidestepping the Legislation Bureau in getting an
agency document published do indeed exist.
One can infer an important consequence from this arrangement,"' namely
that, even more so than in the regulation-making process, the Legislation
Bureau will not take any significant positions of its own in applying the criteria of the Normative Document Rules in pre-publication review. It will not
be able to maintain any such positions, not only because (as discussed in the
third section of this article) it is a constituency-less agency, but also because
it has nothing like a final say in the pre-publication review process.
This fact in turn could seriously affect the implementation of a major aspect of the Normative Document Rules not yet mentioned. There is in fact a
third set of requirements that agencies are expected to meet in the making of
normative documents. A substantial chapter of the regulation is devoted to
circumstances in which agencies (and district governments) should solicit public
as well as expert opinions before issuing normative documents. 4 0 The provisions give recognition to the fact that agency policies might have harmful
consequences (which call for preventive and remedial measures), might be
controversial (requiring scientific and feasibility studies), might make use of
new technologies or affect the environment in ways with which they have not
had sufficient experience (giving rise to the need of expert opinions), or may
simply affect a sufficient number of people's lives that different voices should
be heard. Correspondingly, the articles delineate various channels of public
input.'"' Most prominently, when "a document closely touches the vital interest of citizens or has a substantial impact on the region or sector it regulates,"
the Rules require the relevant agency "in appropriate ways [to] solicit publicly
the opinions and suggestions of relevant entities and individuals." Public solicitation of opinion must also follow appropriate procedures.' 42
However, these progressive visions are expressed in a legal language (using
phrases such as "substantial impact", "when necessary", and "in appropriate
ways") that, potentially, leaves the choice of whether or not to solicit public

us However, according to the author's interviews in Shenzhen, government agencies can sometimes get
around the Legislation Bureau by having the legislation adopted by the People's Congress Standing
Committee instead.
139 Whether the inference is correct cannot presently be known. The Normative Document Rules have
come into effect so recently, and efforts have been mostly focused on achieving compliance with it,
that the regulation's long-term effect on the production of normative documents will emerge only
after some time.
140 Normative Document Rules, Ch 2 ("The Making of Documents"), Arts 10-16.
141 For example, Arts 13 and 14 provide that all entities and individuals can submit oral or written
opinions or suggestions to agencies preparing new normative documents, and that the latter should
respond to these voices.
142 Normative Document Rules, Art 10. Moreover, "when parties subject to regulation are identifiable,
when necessary, the agency proposing the document should solicit the opinion of the majority of
such parties."
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or expert opinion entirely to agency discretion. As will be further discussed
below, Chinese government agencies are generally quite averse to soliciting
policy input publicly. Instead, they traditionally have been allowed to follow
their own preferences completely as to when and from whom to solicit
opinions.' In light of this background, the suspicion may arise that this part
of the Normative Document Rules is purely hortatory.
As if to dispel this suspicion, a later provision of the Rules"' states that one
ground on which the Legislation Bureau can reject a normative documents
proposed for publication is that the proponent agency "did not conduct public
solicitation of opinions or engage in debate according to [the provisions of]
these Rules." That is, the Legislation Bureau is expected to interpret the general normative language of the Rules and take a stand on the adequacy of
various agency policymaking procedures. This expectation, however, runs contrary to our prediction that the Legislation Bureau, by virtue of its place in the
pre-publication review process, will not take significant positions.'
To conclude this description of the Shenzhen Normative Document Rules,
it should be noted that the regulation does make room for the post-publication
review of normative documents by the Legislation Bureau. Even after a normative documents has taken effect, if the Legislation Bureau finds that it has violated
any of the first two sets of criteria mentioned earlier ((1)-(6) and (a)-(f)), or
"has not adequately heeded the opinions of affected parties or of the public,"'
it can either recommend modification or revocation to the responsible agency,
or recommend such actions to the Municipal Government. This general review power of the Legislation Bureau is in line with the more familiar role of
the Legislation Bureau as the legal advisor of the Municipal Government. It
bears a strong resemblance to the review power, at the national level, of the
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council over local and ministerial statutes and regulations. The operation of this form of general review power will be
discussed below in the fifth section of this article, in connection with the State
Council's recent Recording Rules. For now, it may be suggested that at least
during the process of pre-publication review of normative documents, the
Shenzhen government has been ambivalent about giving any entity sufficient
legitimacy to question the policymaking processes of individual bureaus.

See Cai Dingjian, "Public Participation Is Indispensable for Improving the Quality of Legislation"
[in Chinese], Legal Daily, 2 July 2000; "Publicity and Debate: the Essence of Legislative Hearings"
[in Chinese], Legal Daily, 6 May 2001; newspaper interview with Cai Dingjian on legislative hearings
[in Chinese], Workers Daily, 23 Feb 2001,
144 Normative Document Rules, Art 22, para 4.
145 It may also be noted that there is no explicit requirement in the Rules for government agencies to
include material concerning the extent and result of public consultations when submitting normative documents to the Legislation Bureau for review.
146 Normative Document Rules, Art 39, which also gives two further possible grounds for the Legislation
Bureau's action: the submission, in the pre-publication review process, of material that is "substantially untrue", and a catch-all category of "other violations".
1
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Agency and Legislative Hearings
An even stronger ambivalence characterises the Shenzhen government's
attitude towards another innovation in lawmaking procedures that is gaining
wide publicity in China: the holding of public hearings."'
In the current Chinese context, it is crucial to distinguish between public
hearings held by offices in the executive branch (which one might term "rulemaking hearings") and those conducted by entities within local people's
congresses (which one might call "legislative hearings"). This is true even
though legislative hearings can potentially have great impact on the work of
government agencies. As of 2001, most of the reported instances of public
hearings in China were conducted by the legislative branch.14' By contrast,
national and local executive branch offices have been extremely hesitant to
introduce genuine public hearings into their policymaking process. For
example, in a much reported case in January 2002, the National Planning
Commission held a hearing to consider the setting of rates for railroad passenger fares, but had left undisclosed to the public not only the identities of
participants in the hearing, but indeed the content of the government proposal that was to be the subject of the hearing."'
Shenzhen's Municipal Government has also failed adequately to institute
public hearing procedures, either for the municipal bureaus or for its own purpose of making local regulations. With respect to the bureaus, the only public
hearing requirement contained in the Normative Document Rules states: "When
hearings are required before the making of [normative] documents by Laws,
statutes, and regulations, the [relevant agencies] ... must conduct hearings."s150

The legal significance of this provision is minimal, since any subject matter (eg
the establishment of shenpi procedures) for which hearings are likely to be
required by Laws, statutes and regulations is also likely to be removed by the
same laws from the sphere of normative documents altogether.
Even in the area of shenpi reform, where government regulatory policies
have taken much heat, the idea of holding public hearings during the making
of regulations has gained only minimal acceptance. For instance, after the first
round of shenpi reform in 1997, the "Regulation on Reform of Shenzhen's Shenpi
System""' prescribed that "the Municipal Government shall organise hearings on proposals for new Special Economic Zone regulations, or proposals for
147 For a compilation of reports about the practice of public hearings in China, see http://www.e-cpcs.org.
14

See Chen Sixi, Cai Dingjian and Wu Guofang, "A Survey of Local Legislative Hearings," available at

http://www.e-cpcs.org.
"A Hearing Without Publicity?" [in Chinese] (12 Jan 2002), China Economic Times; "Hearing Procedure Raises Three Major Puzzles" [in Chinese], ChinaYouth Daily, 8 Jan 2002. See also interview with
Ma Huaide (an administrative law scholar who also participated in the hearing), China Youth Daily,
14 Jan 2002. Cf National Development and Planning Commission (NDPC), Regulations on Government Rate-Setting (trial stage) [in Chinese] (16 Dec 2001), NDPC (2001) Order No.17.
150 Normative Document Rules. Art 10, para 3.
1' See (n 14 above) translated in Appendix One to this report.
14
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new statutes [submitted to the People's Congress], when the proposals involve
the establishment of shenpi requirements.""' No such hearing is known to
have taken place. Perhaps this was due to the fact that most new shenpi
requirements after 1999 were established by municipal bureaus themselves.
Now that (since 2001) the power of establishing shenpi requirements has been
explicitly taken away from the bureaus,"' should one expect more frequent
instances of public hearing procedures? The new "Regulations Regarding the
System of Shenpi and Registration in Shenzhen"I" partially restate the hearing provision of the 1999 regulation, and add further paragraphs sketching
certain hearing procedures."' Yet the reluctance of these additions is almost
palpable: the regulation says nothing about how the hearing report will be used
in the later stages of decision-making on the relevant regulations. By contrast,
it has become common practice in jurisdictions that have experimented with
legislative hearings - including Shenzhen itself - to stipulate that hearing reports are to be treated as "important" bases for legislative decision-making. 5 6
There have been two reported public hearings held by the Standing
Committee of the People's Congress in Shenzhen, 57 and the latter entity has
recently published new procedural rules on hearings." These developments
will no doubt bear on regulatory policymaking in some areas in the future.
However, the reason why administrative agencies in China resist introducing
public hearings into their own rule-making process constitutes an even stronger reason for these agencies to avoid exposing themselves in the legislative
domain: too many diverse and conflicting opinions and interests would be
exposed, thereby undermining the agencies' authority. For those interested in
broadening the policymaking process in shenpi reform, the basic question is
not how to bring legislative hearings into the picture, but indeed how to make
use of the legislature in the first place. Unfortunately, it is extraordinarily

[bid., Art 4.
153 See accompanying text (n 123 above).
154 Translated as Appendix Two to this report.
155 [bid., Art 4.
156 Cf "Public Hearing Rules for the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen People's Congress" (26 Dec
2001), Shenzhen People's Congress Standing Committee Public (2001) Notice no.37 (see Art 38 in
particular).
157 The first was in Nov 2000. See (n 148 above). The second was on 24 Jan 2002; see "Legal Committee
of the People's Congress Holds Legislative Hearing" [in Chinese], Shenthen SEZ Daily, 25 Jan 2002.
158 See (n 156 above). The rules contain much that is of interest, and are certainly much more extensive
than anything the Municipal Government has offered. However, it is vital to remember that legislatures and executive branch offices are completely different kinds of institutions, and therefore their
procedures must be measured by completely different standards. It is the business of people's congresses to make law and to "represent" the people; these cannot be said to be the main business of
government agencies. Hence it would be misguided to disparage agency rule-making procedures by
comparisons with legislative procedures - or to applaud the latter by comparisons with the former.
152
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difficult to foresee the introduction of significant legislative supervision of
executive branch policymaking in China at the present moment.'
In 2001, the main opportunities for creating greater input into the
policymaking process in China appeared to hinge on the improvement of
internal monitoring. The policies of more and more government agencies
were being subject to the review of - and potential challenge by - the chief
executive offices in the various levels of government. This was observable
not only in Shenzhen; other administrative changes, such as some - discussed
in the next section - taking place at the State Council, also illustrate what
might be called a drive to enhance executive control. While such a drive
does not directly open up policymaking to external monitoring, it could do so
indirectly by casting a favourable light on certain existing mechanisms of
external monitoring that facilitate executive control, and thus making legal
measures that bolster these mechanisms politically attractive.
To understand precisely how mechanisms of external monitoring and internal monitoring can mutually support, one needs to focus more closely on the
content of certain legal doctrines than the kind of empirical analysis so far
pursued allows. To some extent, in fact, examination of legal doctrines can
serve as a form of empirical generalisation. For example, the analysis of the
legal authority contained in the State Council's recent Recording Rules given
in the next section reveals a pervasive institutional configuration in China, of
which the setup in Shenzhen is merely an instance. But more importantly,
legal analysis allows us to imagine legal devices that better serve certain purposes of the law. It thereby takes us into a quasi-normative realm. This will be
the tack we take in the next and last section, where, leaving behind the peculiarities of Shenzhen's institutions, we examine legal instruments that could
simultaneously reinforce executive control and strengthen external monitoring.

Enhancing Executive Control
We will start with a new administrative regulation promulgated by the
Chinese State Council. Although at first sight the regulation does not speak
to shenpi reform directly, it addresses a type of administrative arrangement
potentially crucial to the success of shenpi reform.
159 The problem is not just the political and institutional marginalisation of the legislative branch, though
as mentioned in the third section, most organisers of shenpi reform were indeed happy to bypass it.
The Chinese judiciary, equally dwarfed by the executive branch, has at least benefited from the
Administrative Litigation Law of 1989, which significantly bolstered its institutional legitimacy. By
contrast, the provisions for legislative supervision of the executive branch in the Legislation Law do
not contain nearly as much detail to support such supervision. In other words, even the ideological
foundation of legislative supervision of the executive branch has yet to be laid. The articles on legislative supervision are available at http://www.e-cpcs.org.
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The State Council's Recording Rules
The title of the State Council's "Rules Governing the Recording of Statutes
and Regulations""' (the "Recording Rules") suggests a more humble purpose
for the administrative regulation than is actually true of its content. The relatively short regulation not only lays out procedures for registering ministerial
regulations and local statutes and regulations with the State Council, but
also prescribes ways in which the laws thus put on file will be reviewed by the
State Council: it sets forth who is to review them, the scope of review, and
what consequences review might lead to. The system of review delineated
arises out of and has been anticipated by the Legislation Law of 2000. The
Legislation Law makes explicit the places, in a hierarchy of laws, for statutes
and regulations issued by different national and local government and legislative entities in China."6 ' The hierarchy, at the top of which are the
Constitution and National Laws, determines the ways in which conflicts
among laws from these different sources are resolved.' 62 To ensure conformity
with this hierarchy, mechanisms for detecting deviations must be put in place,
and it is also desirable to publish the procedures by which deviant cases will
be disposed of. A main purpose of the Recording Rules is publicly to institute
just one such mechanism.' Mandatory recording requirements prescribed
in the rules facilitate the routine detection of inconsistencies of law, and a
"legal department" (fazhi jigou) under the State Council will adjudicate those
inconsistencies of law which the Legislation Law has granted the State Council
the power to adjudicate.' Moreover, the recording requirements enable a
centralised system of publications of legal documents.' 5
In addition, pursuant to Article 87 of the Legislation Law, the Recording
Rules also lay out' 66 a set of criteria to be applied in the State Council's review
of statutes and regulations, which include, but are not limited to, conformity to
the hierarchy referred to above. These criteria require the review to examine:

160 Fagui Guizhang Beian Tiaoli, published by the State Council on 14 Dec 2001, and effective on 1Jan
2002. The regulation represents an updating of the "Rules Regarding the Filing of Statutes and Regulations" (Fagui Guizhang Beian Guiding, promulgated and effective on 18 Feb 1990). Though the
1990 regulation also used the term "baian", because its procedure did not serve the purpose of giving
public notice of the registered laws, the term is translated as "filing" rather than "recording".
161 Legislation Law (2000), Ch 5 ("Application and Recording").
162 For example, State Council administrative regulations always prevail over ministerial regulations as
well as local statutes and regulations. Laws enacted by the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee prevail over the same range of statutes and regulations, as well as over administrative
regulations.
163 Similar mechanisms have been or are being created in the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress, as well as in local People's Governments and People's Congresses.
164 The Recording Rules, Arts 12-15.
165 Art 8 of the Recording Rules provides that all compilations of statutes and regulations must use an
index published by the "legal department" of the State Council on the basis of its recording system.
166 Ibid., Art 10. In the Legislation Law, these are given as criteria for determining whether a given law
(including not only statutes and regulations but also national Laws) should be modified or revoked.
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(1) whether a law was made in excess of authorised powers; (2) whether it
violates some higher law; (3) in cases where inconsistencies exist between a
local statute and a ministerial regulation, or between two pieces of regulation,
whether one or both sides should be required to adopt modifications or to revoke
the statute or regulation in question; (4) whether the provisions of a regulation
are inappropriate; (5) whether legally prescribed procedures have been violated.
When deficiencies under criteria (1), (2), and (4) are detected,' 7 Article 14
of the Recording Rules states that the "legal department" within the State
Council shall either recommend corrections to the entity that authored the
problematic legislation or regulation, or recommend a decision to request
modification or revocation to the State Council itself.'
In our earlier discussion in the third section, it was argued that Shenzhen
lacked mechanisms of internal monitoring that would effectively supervise
the implementation of new policies - both encouraging and disciplining agencies to pursue open-ended policy goals in good faith. This form of monitoring
was contrasted with mere compliance monitoring, where the nature of potential agency misconduct can be anticipated and dealt with through precisely
stated rules.' 69 The same distinction can be made with respect to the administrative review authorised by the Recording Rules. The broad criteria that
can be applied in this review leaves open at least a conceptual possibility
that they could enable policy-oriented internal monitoring at the State
Council.170 In fact, the Recording Rules can be seen as a paradigmatic codification of an important administrative arrangement for executive supervision
of policymaking in China. In this arrangement, the executive branch's
internal review of the policies pursued by its myriad agencies is made possible
by one centralised office (a "legal department") attached to the chief executive entity (be it the State Council or a Municipal Government). Although
167 Inconsistencies detected by the application of criterion (3) are resolved in ways described in Arts 12,
13, and 15, ibid. See discussion of Art 15 below. No provision of the Rules states how violations under
criterion (5) should be corrected.
168 The term "State Council" is used here to denote the State Council's Standing Committee, the decision-making body (as opposed to a mere staff office) within this branch and level of government, just
as the term "Municipal Government" is used in Shenzhen's regulations to denote the Municipal
Government's Standing Committee. Cf Art 88, para 3 of the Legislation Law, and generally, the
State Council Organizational Law (1984).
169 Ensuring conformity with the legislative hierarchy in Ch 5 of the Legislation Law often takes the form
only of compliance monitoring. For example, it has been thought that one benefit of the Legislation
Law is that it provides a means for combating local protectionist regulations. See Li Yahong, "The
Law-making Law: A Solution to the Problems in the Chinese Legislative System?" (2000) 30 HKLJ
120-124. When there are relevant provisions in national law against local protectionist legislation, or
even just when there is a relevant national policy, the Legislation Law can indeed be used to overturn
local protectionist legislation, and the Recording Rules provide one set of relevant procedures to
secure this outcome. But local protectionism is arguably a well-known kind of misuse of regulatory
power, and easily detected, so that only compliance-monitoring is required to trigger sanction.
170 The potential relevance of the Recording Rules to shenpi reform at the national level should be
obvious: the recording system could be one way for the State Council to monitor the regulatory
policies of its ministries.
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this office cannot itself request modifications to or revoke agency regulations,
it can recommend such actions to the chief executive entity.
At least nominally, the scope of this kind of executive supervision has
expanded in 2001." How effectively will such review powers be exercised in
practice? With respect to the review authorised by the Recording Rules, we
could make a three-step preliminary assessment, drawing on our study of
Shenzhen's experience.
First, one should consider which entity actually carries out the review.
Though the Recording Rules speak only of a "legal department" of the State
Council, the actual institution that plays this role is the Legislative Affairs
Office (LAO). Our examination of Shenzhen's experience suggests that if the
LAO is subject to similar or additional institutional constraints that attach to
the Shenzhen Legislation Bureau, then there is no realistic chance for policy
supervision to be pursued under the Recording Rules. Or, to put it differently,
only if the LAO is sufficiently strong will there be genuine opportunities for
policy monitoring based on the review mechanisms discussed here."'
Second, one should consider on what basis the LAO could conduct a policyoriented review, even if it decided to do so. Article 6 of the Recording Rules
requires of parties who register regulations"' for record that they submit copies of a filing form, the text of the regulation itself, and an "explanation"
(shuoming, typically something analogous to a preamble).174 Article 11 states
further that when the State Council "legal department" deems necessary, it
can request the relevant ministries or local governments to "provide an opinion" (tichu yijian), or request the makers of the statutes or regulations "to
clarify relevant matters" (shuoming youguan qingkuang). These provisions raise
a serious concern. In the typical case, understanding a policy requires one to
acquire a great deal of knowledge about the factual context on which the
policy has bearing. One cannot simply read off the policy from the legal text
in which it is embodied. And it is unlikely that mere communications with
the policymakers can be a generally adequate means for acquiring the necessary factual knowledge. If the LAO's sources of factual information are limited

171This is illustrated by the Shenzhen Legislation Bureau's new review power before agency normative
documents take effect, discussed in section four above, and by the strengthening of the LAO's role
under the Recording Rules compared to the predecessor Rules Regarding the Filing of Statutes and
Regulations. See (n 161 above).
172 A sketch of the institutional history of the LAO has been given by Murray Scott Tanner, in Ch 6 of
his The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes, and Democratic Prospects (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
173 Art 6 states that submission requirements for local statutes are to be set by the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress.
1 The format and the content of the filing form and the "explanation" were set out in 1990 in the State
Council "Notice Regarding the Implementation of the Rules Regarding the Filing of Statutes and
Regulations" (29 Apr 1990). The Notice makes it clear that the information provided in these two
documents is insubstantial for purposes of understanding policy.
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to those described in Articles 6 and 11, then - particularly in light of the
operational difficulties encountered by the Shen:hen Bureau of Administrative Supervision and the Legislation Bureau in conducting policy supervision
discussed in third section of this article - it seems it could not plausibly conduct meaningful policy review.
This second consideration must be put in its appropriate context, for it
could be argued that the filing of statutes and regulations for record could not
have been intended by itself to initiate a policy review process: the statutes or
regulations have just been made, and even if the LAO is able to engage in
policy review as a general matter, it would not try to second-guess local or
ministerial policymakers, absent any particular reason for thinking that the
laws made by the latter might be problematic. Generally, one expects policy
review to work more in something like the following fashion: some person or
entity for some reason initiates a challenge to a particular policy, and either
the challenger furnishes the necessary factual information for review, or the
challenge itself triggers a fact-gathering process on the part of the reviewer.
This is true both of external and internal monitoring. Internal monitoring
merely requires that the challenge be brought to and resolved within the
executive branch itself.
This leads to our third consideration, which is who, according to the Recording Rules, can set the review mechanism of the State Council in motion
(other than the LAO's spontaneous undertaking of review). The Rules make
two relevant provisions, the first of which is the more commonly used in
actual practice. According to Article 9, "government agencies, civil
associations, business and non-business organisations and citizens" can all
write to the State Council when they find that either local statutes or regulations and certain other decisions17 5 by ministries or local governments "conflict
with" (dichu) the State Council's administrative regulations. The "legal department" then deliberates over the petition and recommends appropriate
action. Though this channel of complaint appears informal, there is evidence
that LAO staff members take it seriously. The volume of petitions is reportedly large, and some have in the past resulted in recommendations of
modification or revocation of regulations.17 Moreover, reviews conducted
by the LAO reportedly deal not just with easy cases: there have been instances where regulations or statutes similar to those challenged have been
adopted in many jurisdictions, in which case extensive testimonies,
communications, and reports to senior officeholders took place during the
review process. More than just compliance monitoring was likely to have
been involved. Information about this aspect of the LAO's work is scant.

175 Specifically, "administrative decisions or orders" that have general applicability.
176 Personal communication with LAO staff members, 2002.
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But this fact itself gives significance to Article 9 of the Recording Rules,
because the latter now through a rule of law calls the public's attention to a
mechanism for initiating the internal monitoring process not previously wellpublicised."7 7
A second provision in the Rules, Article 18, makes reference to another
channel for initiating review at the State Council. This second channel is
uniquely interesting, in that it employs a remarkable legal instrument and
suggests a way of combining internal and external forms of monitoring. Article 18 refers first to Article 15, which says that when there are inconsistencies
between two ministerial regulations, or between a ministerial and a local
regulation, the State Council "legal department" should seek to mediate to
achieve a common ground; if no common ground can be reached between
the relevant government entities, the "legal department" would make a recommendation to the State Council to adopt a decision. Article 18 then says
that the result of the Article 15 process "may serve as an answer to the Supreme Court's request for the State Council's explication or determination
pursuant to Article 53 of the Administrative Litigation Law." Article 53,
Paragraph 2 of the Administrative Litigation Law' provides that when a
court finds inconsistencies between a ministerial and a local regulation, or
between two ministerial regulations (when both are alleged to be applicable),
it can submit a question to the Supreme People's Court as to which regulation to apply. The Supreme People's Court in turn is to send the question to
the State Council for resolution. Article 18 of the Recording Rules thus completes the description of this legal device.
The device is remarkable for two reasons. First, whatever its origin in the
Chinese judicial system, it resembles procedures in other countries whereby a
lower court can certify a question of law to a superior court - procedures that
enhance the operation of the judicial system.' 9 Secondly, the device embodies the idea that, even when there is a particular issue crucial to a legal dispute
that cannot be dealt with within the judicial system, this need not prevent
the dispute from being brought before a court. Initiating judicial proceedings
can be a way of setting in motion a process that necessarily requires a decision
within the executive branch. In other words, legal instruments can sometimes be crafted to combine internal and external forms of monitoring.
177 By contrast, the predecessor "Rules Regarding the Filing of Statutes and Regulations" only stated (in
Art 7) that government agencies should alert the State Council to cases where administrative regulations have been violated by local statutes or ministerial or local regulations.
178 Promulgated by the National People's Congress on 4 Apr 1989 and effective on 1 Oct 1990.
179 In the US, a US court of appeals can ask the Supreme Court or the highest state court to review a
question of law arising in a case pending before it on which the court of appeals needs guidance. See
15 USCA ss 1254(2). For a report of a trend in which lower European national courts have been
certifying questions of law to the European Court of Justice, see Anne-Marie Slaughter and Walter
Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration" (1993) 47 International
Organization 41.
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This can be particularly useful when institutional constraints prevent either form of monitoring from functioning effectively alone. For example,
suppose that, for fundamental considerations of institutional legitimacy, courts
cannot invalidate the rules or regulations of government agencies. Suppose
further that, even though certain offices in the executive branch have the
authority to revoke or modify agencies' choices of policy, they cannot meaningfully exercise this authority without some third party presenting challenges
to agencies, as well as presenting the necessary factual information for assessing the merits of such challenges. In this situation, combining judicial
proceedings and the exercise of executive authority into one legal procedure
holds obvious attraction. On the one hand, judicial proceedings can go forward without fears of transcending the bounds of institutional legitimacy; on
the other, the evidentiary process of a judicial proceeding can help develop a
factual basis for the executive branch to conduct policy review.
Though this idea is suggested by Article 53 of the Administrative Litigation Law and Article 18 of the Recording Rules, these legal texts do not
themselves express the idea. The scope of these two linked provisions is much
narrower than Article 9 of the Recording Rules: the occasion for a lower
court's certification to the Supreme People's Court of a question eventually
for the State Council to decide is not a lower statute or regulation coming
into conflict with a State Council administrative regulation, but simply that
two inconsistent regulations have been issued by two distinct government
entities (where neither entity could claim that its regulation should be given
effect over that of the other). Since the policy objectives of one ministry are
usually not determined by the policies of another, and the policy objectives
of a local People's Government are normally not bound by the policies of a
national ministry (or vice versa), the linked provisions of the Administrative
Litigation Law and the Recording Rules can be expected to apply only to
resolve technical, not substantive, issues of law.
The foregoing assessment of the Recording Rules indicates that, although
the regulation does not do enough adequately ensure effective executive review over agency polices, the area is rife with opportunities for change. Clearly,
if courts could certify questions about substantive as well as technical issues
of law to suitable entities that enjoy executive review power, administrative
litigation could with much greater frequency provide the occasions as well as
the factual bases for the exercise of such power. For example, in so far as the
State Council's executive review power is concerned, it would be desirable if
courts could resort to it when they find lower laws (eg ministerial regulations,
local statutes or regulations, etc) conflicting with administrative regulations.
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This would require expanding the scope of the interlocutory procedures described in Article 53, Paragraph 2 of the Administrative Litigation Law, and
giving the judiciary the same access to the State Council as Article 9 of the
Recording Rules give to ordinary citizens. More generally, of course, administrative litigation can be allowed to activate not just the State Council's
executive review power. When conflicts in the lower orders of law require
resolution, it may be appropriate for judicial interlocutory procedures to end
at lower levels in the executive branch. For example, if a Shenzhen court
finds that a bureau normative document conflicts with a Shenzhen local
regulation, the court might be allowed to request the Shenzhen Municipal
Government to engage in review.
Although significant changes would have to be made to the Administrative Litigation Law to realised the reform possibilities just noted, what makes
such changes worthy of attention is that they do not run afoul of any obvious
political and institutional constraints, for example by expanding the powers
of the legislative or judicial branch at the expense of the executive branch. In
this sense, they are eminently feasible even in the short-term.

Administrative Law Mechanisms
The possibility of enhancing executive review is not the only way in which
strengthened administrative litigation procedures can have an impact on the
policymaking activities of government agencies. As was discussed earlier in
fourth section, administrative litigation gives reality to a concept that arguably is needed in Chinese public administration, namely the concept of legal
liabilities attaching to agencies and not just to individual officials. It is difficult to hold agencies accountable for their policies through legal sanctions
imposed on individual officials alone, because such legal sanctions should
apply only when individuals have violated clearly prescribed rules. Therefore,
if legal liability were to be used at all to create accountability for agency policy,
it would have to be some form of sanction against agencies. This consideration again underscores the potential relevance of administrative litigation
mechanisms to shenpi reform.
The ways in which administrative litigation can be brought to bear on
policymaking can be elaborated by reference to two current lines of criticism of the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL). The first line of criticism
tends to come from judges and legal scholars, and focuses on the fact that
the ALL does not permit judges to invalidate government decisions of general applicability (ie decisions from the issuing of normative documents
and general orders to the adoption of regulations and statutes). Instead, it
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authorises only invalidation of government decisions in individual cases." 0
The ALL does give courts implicit authority not to apply a particular
government order, rule or regulation to a particular case, and it has been
suggested that more and more Chinese judges are resorting to this technique when they encounter government policies that are in fact illegal.' 8 '
However, it might be argued that this technique still prevents courts from
performing one of their vital institutional tasks, namely clarifying for the
public what the law is.' As a result of this criticism, judges and legal scholars
have tended to advocate revisions of the ALL to allow judicial invalidation
of government decisions of general applicability. Here, however, serious
questions of institutional legitimacy arise - for example, should courts be
allowed to invalidate just normative documents and equivalent types of
government orders, or should they be allowed to invalidate local and
ministerial regulations, or perhaps even higher law?
It seems that, at least in so far as rules and regulations adopted by the
executive branch are concerned, these large questions can be sidestepped if
courts can, for the purpose of adjudicating individual cases, appeal to executive entities to review whether certain rules or regulations should be invalidated
or modified. The study presented in this report of procedures both in
Shenzhen's municipal government and in the national State Council shows
that such entities clearly do exist in the executive branch. Giving courts access to these entities will not only provide the latter with more information,
but also strengthen them with a possible constituency. In other words, there
are more options for the reform of the ALL than are currently canvassed in
discussions by legal scholars. The reform need not aim to enable courts to
invalidate inappropriate policies directly; it should be enough if judicial proceedings can be made to significantly increase the overall likelihood that
inappropriate policies are invalidated.
The second line of criticism of the ALL tends to come from those interested in substantive policy challenges faced by the government. For them,
180 See, for example, Art 54 of the Administrative Litigation Law. Sometimes the point is stated in terms

of the courts' lack of authorisation to review government decisions of general applicability. This
formulation tends to conflate a number of issues. The first is that, under ALL Art 12, para 2, no one
is allowed to initiate a proceeding under the ALL simply to challenge a government decision of
general applicability, without alleging that the government has taken action against particular parties (or failed to take action on behalf of particular parties) in ways that threaten harm. In other
words, there is no pre-enforcement review under the ALL. The second issue, as stated in the text, is
that judges are not authorised to declare a government decision of general applicability invalid or
effectively revoke such decisions. Even given these limitations, a judge might still review a generally
applicable government decision and choose not to apply it to the case before the court, if the decision is found to be illegal or otherwise inappropriate. For these distinctions see Gan Wen, "Judicial
Review of Abstract Administrative Acts" [in Chinese] (2001), paper presented to the SinoAmerican Conference on Administrative Litigation.
181Ibid.
182 Gan Wen argues that the technique is "incompatible with ... the requirement that courts adequately
explain the reasons and basis of their decisions." Ibid.
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the ALL's strong focus on the protection of individual rights threatens to
exclude from the ambition of administrative law the goal of improving government policymaking 8 3 For example, it is perceived that the kinds of
sanctions against government actions provided in the ALL are relatively trivial:
at the most, agencies are required to revoke particular actions and pay compensatory damages. According to this criticism, administrative law should
strive to shape government conduct more actively. Of course, if the judiciary
were to be allowed to invalidate government rules and regulations or perhaps
even to engage in pre-enforcement review, then this line of criticism would
lose some force. However, this second group of critics - who are more likely
to be government officials than judges - would demur at such proposals. For
them, there is no reason particularly to trust - and perhaps many reasons to
distrust - the judiciary to make policy decisions.
What this second group of critics neglect is that the ALL could be made
to inflict less trivial sanctions against government agencies than it currently
does. For example, it has been suggested that in order to deter irresponsible
policies in the regulatory arena, the government can be required to pay some
form of reliance damages as well as compensatory damages." Another possibility that should be of interest is the more active use by courts of injunctive
remedies. Arguably, the availability of injunctive remedies is a crucial determinant of whether administrative litigation procedures are put to optimal
use. Their current unavailability restricts the range of government actions
that citizens can challenge to only those actions that have already clearly
caused harm, and diminishes the incentives citizens have for suing government so that suits are brought only in those instances where monetary
compensation could not be secured in any other fashion (eg through settlement with government agencies). This in turn reduces the likelihood of
government agencies of being sued in court, and therefore agency incentives
to modify their operations. Conversely, the addition of injunctive remedies
could greatly improve the accountability of government agencies.
The ALL already authorises something like the preliminary injunction
under special circumstances. It prescribes that, generally, challenged administrative actions will not be suspended during litigation, but exceptions
can be made in certain situations, 18 5 such as when, upon the plaintiff's
petition, the court finds that continuance of the government action would

183 Communication with members of the State Council Legislative Affairs Office. This kind of critique
has been offered in European administrative law, for example in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling
Environment Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
184 Ma Huaide, "The Legal Responsibilities that Attach to Administrative Licensing" [in Chinese], available at http://www.jcrb.com/ournews/asp/flxr/mahd/index.asp?id= 119.
185 ALL Art 44. The article provides for two other exceptions besides the one discussed in the text: (a)
when the (government) defendant deems it necessary to suspend the actions; and (b) when laws and
statutes order such suspensions.
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cause irreparable damage, and that the action's suspension would not cause
harm to the public interest. In this latter situation, the court could order
the government to suspend its actions. It is not clear how often Chinese
courts use this form of preliminary injunction, or if any consensus has
emerged as to when it can be used. Suppose, however, that courts could use
interlocutory procedures to request appropriate offices in the executive
branch to review problematic government rules or regulations. This would
certainly provide clear-cut grounds on which injunctive orders against government agencies could be issued. In other words, interlocutory procedures
that combine internal and external monitoring both require and support
the use of injunctive remedies.
It should be pointed out that, in spirit, at least, the kind of combination of
external and internal monitoring considered here is not all that different from
the procedures that currently exist under the Administrative Reconsideration Law (1999). The latter law provides that"' if a complainant applying for
administrative review of a government decision in an individual case is also
of the view that the government policy upon which the decision is based is
"tnot in accordance with law", he or she can petition the reviewing administrative body to examine the legality of the policy. The policies that can be
brought under such review are those expressed by normative documents or
equivalent government orders. Ministerial and local regulations, on the other
hand, are specifically excluded. But putting aside this limitation, one can see
that, at least sometimes, administrative reconsideration procedures will indeed reach all the way to the kind of internal monitoring institutions we
discussed earlier. In Shenzhen, for example, petitions for administrative reconsideration can be brought to the Legislation Bureau, and indeed many
are."' The Administrative Reconsideration Law specifically instructs the reviewing body to examine whether a challenged rule is "not in accordance
with law". If such in fact is the finding, the reviewing body can do either of
two things: if it has the power to revoke or modify the rule, it can exercise
that power; if it does not, it can transfer the controversy over the rule to a
competent entity for resolution.'
This further confirms that the proposal we have made for combining
internal and external monitoring has institutional and political feasibility.
To reiterate, the proposal is to broaden the scope of interlocutory procedures by which courts could tap policy supervision powers within the
executive branch. The procedures should be made available for the resolution of substantive as well as technical issues of law, and they should allow
1'6 Administrative Reconideration Law Art 7.
187 A separate division of the Legislation Bureau is devoted to administrative reconsideration. Inter,
views with members of the division suggest that it operates reasonably well.
1 Ibid., Art 27.
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courts to resort to different levels of executive power and not just the State
Council. Finally, injunctive remedies should be explicitly allowed in connection with such procedures. While these changes have been presented as
involving revisions of the Administrative Litigation Law, they can also be
adopted sooner, for example by being incorporated into the Administrative
Licensing Law to aid the currently ongoing shenpi reform. The Administrative Litigation Law does not preclude - in fact in places it anticipates'" the possibility that other statutes will selectively authorise broader uses of
administrative litigation procedures.

Conclusion
The proposal advocated in the last section is not merely the result of an abstract exercise of the legal imagination. Instead it is grounded in our empirical
investigation of how shenpi reform has been carried out in Shenzhen. That
investigation has been particularly useful in revealing to us which institutions are likely to be relied on for implementing shenpi reform, how likely
these institutions are to review the substantive policies of particular government agencies in light of the principles advocated in the reform, and in what
fashion such review are conducted. If anything can enable us to understand
the course of shenpi reform from the inside, it is not the mere rhetoric of the
reform, but a grasp of these organisational arrangements.
In a fundamental way, this report has been critical of the political preferences of Shenzhen's shenpi reform's organisers (which may be the preferences
of the organisers of shenpi reform at the national level as well). We have insisted that a comprehensive overhaul of regulatory policies in China cannot
be accomplished without changes in the policymaking process. This is because currently, the design of regulatory policies - or, more precisely, the
evolution of policies from open-ended statements of goals to concrete administrable measures - tend to be left entirely to the hands of unaccountable
agencies attached to traditional modes of operation, resulting in inevitable
policy distortions. Officials in charge of shenpi reform seem to have been in
denial of this basic fact. In some instances, they seem to have hoped that,
merely by mobilising the resources of bureaucratic expertise, but without extensive public input, 190 the direction of China's future regulatory state can be
determined. In other instances, such as in Shenzhen, officials did not hold
out for the possibility of a fundamental reorientation of regulatory policies,
18 9 ALL Art 11.

190At the national level, feedback to drafts of the Administrative Licensing Law was solicited within
the executive branch during 2001 and 2002. Personal communication with members of the State
Council LAO.
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and pushed instead to cut red tape and improve bureaucratic efficiency. The
resulting gap between the rhetoric of reform and its actual practice is at least
as great as the gap between rhetoric and reality in other attempts to pursue
novel policies in the past.
However, it has also been the view of this report that changes to the existing policymaking process can occur only in an incremental fashion. Instead of
gesturing to the benefits of checks-and-balances that characterise western democratic political institutions, one must be prepared to delve into the finer details
of institutional design, taking current institutions as seriously as one can.
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APPENDIX ONE

Regulations on the Reform of Shenzhen's Shenpi System
(Passed on 25 August 1998 at the 111th meeting of the Second Municipal
Government Standing Committee,
effective as of 13 February 1999)

Article 1
This regulation is enacted, with a view to the actual circumstances in
Shenzhen, for the purposes of changing the functions of the government,
standardizing practices in shenpi, reducing the number of shenpi procedures,
improving efficiency, strengthening the building of a clear government, and
bolstering administration according to law.

Article 2
The terms "shenpi" in this Regulation refers to administrative actions including shenpi, the granting of approval and of permission, the certification of
qualifications or aptitude, verification, consent, and other similar actions.

Article 3
Shenpi requirements must be established in accordance with law. When implementing shenpi, governments at different levels and their departments must
comply with the provisions of Laws, statutes, and regulations.

Article 4
The competent administrative legal department of the Municipal Government shall organize hearings on proposals for new Special Economic Zone
regulations, or proposals for new statutes submitted by the Municipal Government [to the People's Congress], when the proposals involve the
establishment of shenpi requirements.
Procedures for such hearings shall be prescribed separately by the Municipal Government.

Article 5
When establishing and implementing shenpi, the substance, criteria, function and responsibilities, and time limits of the shenpi should be made clear,
procedures should be simplified, and operating methods made public.
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Article 6
Governments at different levels and their departments should set up systems
of internal monitoring; important shenpi decisions must be made collectively.

Article 7
When [an agency] violates this Regulation by establishing and implementing
shenpi requirements without authorization, the shenpi in question shall be
considered void, and the municipal government shall repeal the requirement.
The municipal government shall order the competent department to pursue
administrative responsibility against the relevant agency, its manager(s), and
member(s) directly accountable for the violation.
When damages are caused by the approval of a shenpi which is subsequently
considered void, [the agency committing the violation] shall be responsible
for compensation according to law. When illegal profit is derived [from shenpi],
the whole amount shall be surrendered to the Municipal Treasury.

Article 8
This regulation is effective on the day it is published.
Appendix: Index of Retained and Repealed Shenpi and Verification
(hezhun) Requirements of Government Agencies.
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APPENDIX TWO
Decree of the Shenzhen's People's Government
No.105
The 40th Meeting of the Third Municipal Government Standing Committee has approved "Regulations Concerning Shenzhen's System of Shenpi
and Registration". It is hereby published, to be effective on and after
1 November 2001.
Mayor: Yu Youjun
22 October 2001
Article 1
This regulation is enacted, with a view to the actual circumstances in
Shenzhen, for the purposes of changing the functions of the government,
standardizing practices in shenpi and registration, improving administrative
efficiency and effectiveness, and bolstering administration according to law.
Article 2
The terms "shenpi" and "registration" in this Regulation refer to actions on
the part of administrative agencies that are based on applications from natural persons, legal persons, and other organizations, and that are of the nature
of granting approvals, permissions, the certification of qualifications or
aptitude, verification, and other similar administrative actions.

Article 3
Shenpi and registration requirements must be established in accordance
with law.
When implementing any form of shenpi or registration, governments at
different levels and their departments shall strictly comply with the provisions of Laws, statutes, and regulations.

Article 4
The legal department of the Municipal Government shall organize hearings
on proposals for new regulations, or proposals for new statutes submitted by
the Municipal Government [to the People's Congress], when the proposals
involve the establishment of shenpi or registration requirements.
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Hearings shall be conducted according to the following procedures:
(1) The office organizing a hearing shall publish notices of the hearing
in Shenzhen SEZ Daily and Shenzhen Commerce Daily fifteen days before the hearing is to take place. The notices shall disclose the name
of the proposed regulation or statute, the shenpi or registration requirements involved, the time(s) and place(s) for obtaining drafts of
the statute or regulation free of fee, methods for participating in the
hearing, and so on;
(2) The office organizing the hearing shall designate legal department
members, or else legal experts, to preside over the hearing, and shall
publicize the specific format of the hearing;
(3) At the hearings, responsible members from the competent administrative agencies or their representatives, shall advance the reasons or
grounds for establishing the shenpi or registration requirements in
question; other participants or their representatives may initiate
debate or cross-examination;
(4) A written record shall be made of the hearing, and participants in the
hearing or their representative shall sign or seal the record;
(5) Within ten days after the conclusion of the hearing, those who have
presided over the hearing shall submit a Hearing Report to the organizing office, in which a Hearing Opinion shall be stated.
Hearings shall be held publicly. Journalists shall be allowed to conduct
interviews and report.

Article 5
For shenpi or registration requirements to be established, the substance, criteria,
function and obligations imposed as well as the time limits of the requirements must be published in the Shenzhen People's Government Bulletin. Shenpi
or registration procedures shall be simplified, and made publicly known. Shenpi
or registration requirements for which there have not been public notices
shall not be implemented.
When any organization or individual submits an application for shenpi or
registration, the relevant government department shall accept the application and furnish a receipt for the application (including a form itemizing the
materials submitted). When submissions do not satisfy standards prescribed
by Laws, statutes, and regulations, the department accepting the application
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shall, simultaneously with the receipt, provide a written notice stating all of
the documents and materials that the applicant needs to supplement or modify,
as well as other details, [in order to complete the application].
Article 6
When an application meets relevant criteria, and when there are no limitations on the number of approvals to be granted, the shenpi agency shall approve
the application.
Article 7
For applications subject to quota restrictions, the shenpi agency should made
decisions by inviting bids, conducting auctions, or by consulting the opinion
of expert advisory committees. Agency executives are prohibited from deciding on the applications on their own.
Expert advisory committees shall be composed of lawyers, accountants, or
other specialists. No member of the shenpi agency can be made a member of
the expert advisory committee.
The shenpi agency shall prescribe rules regarding the formation and deliberative procedures of expert advisory committees, and such rules shall be
published in the Shenzhen People's Government Bulletin.
With regard to the establishment of high or new technology businesses,
the principle of "registration first, shenpi afterwards" shall be observed.

Article 8
Unless otherwise provided by Laws, statutes, and regulations, shenpi or registration should be completed within fifteen days after the acceptance of the
application.
For a notice is issued pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 5 of this Regulation,
time limits shall be calculated beginning on the day when the application is
submitted for the second time.

Article 9
Governments at different levels and their departments should establish systems of internal supervision for shenpi. Important decisions must be made on
the basis of collective discussion.

Article 10
When [an agency] violates this Regulation by establishing shenpi or registration requirements without authorization, and by implementing such
requirements, the shenpi and registration in question shall be considered void,
and the agency shall be publicly reprimanded by administrative supervision
departments. Administrative responsibility shall be held against the agency
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member(s) directly accountable for the violation and against the responsible
department manager(s).
When damages are caused by the granting of approval under a shenpi or
registration procedure considered void, or by the illegal implementation of
shenpi or registration, [the agency committing the violation] shall be responsible for compensation according to law. When illegal profit is derived [from
shenpil, the whole amount shall be surrendered to the Municipal Treasury.
Article 11
The Municipal Government shall notify the public regarding newly instituted or repealed shenpi requirements annually, before January 10, using the
Shenzhen People's Government Bulletin.
Article 12
This Regulation shall take effect on the day it is published. Decree No.83 of
the Shenzhen's People's Government ("Regulation Regarding Shenzhen's
Shenpi Reform") and its Appendix are hereby repealed, with the exception
that those parts of the said Appendix's content which do not conflict with
this Regulation shall continue to have effect.
Appendix: Repealed and Retained Shenpi (and Verification) Items.

